>The RAF...had...a home mover's advantage in that pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for

>The RAF...had...a home mover's advantage in that pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for a PoW camp if German). Not just shot-down pilots: a battle-damaged British plane had a good chance of limping back to a safe landing (at an airstrip or even a country road), while a battle-damaged German plane had much lower chances of lasting long enough to land in German territory. Even when British planes were completely shot down, the wreckage could often be recovered and used for spare parts. The "Cactus Air Force" on Guadalcanal had similar advantages. >Finally, unlike the Lufwaffe, the RAF had the world's first integrated air defense network, with radar pickets to detect inbound bombers, control centres to direct the interceptors, and radio-directed fighters. People usually understand the more immediate advantages of this system ("get the jump on the enemy," etc.), but often miss the deeper implication: this was, if you'll pardon the use of a buzz-word, a true force multiplier. If they had not had their IADS, the British would have been forced to fly constant patrols all along their coastline, spreading themselves thin in an attempt to catch all of the incoming German forces. At the tactical level, their formations would have been outnumbered in most cases. At the strategic level, their crews and planes would have been worn out from ceaseless flying. Instead, they were able to keep most of their planes on the ground, with well-rested alert crews standing by, then concentrate large numbers of planes exactly where they were needed at exactly the right time.