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Full of factual errors and bombastic opinion masquerading as truth. British air-to-air kills during the Battle of Britain were heavily weighted in favour of the

by cstross 15y ago

Full of factual errors and bombastic opinion masquerading as truth. British air-to-air kills during the Battle of Britain were heavily weighted in favour of the slower, older Hurricane (which was more numerous in service, and perfectly capable of mixing it with the majority of Lufwaffe aircraft in 1940). The RAF, which began re-arming in late 1937/38, actually had newer aircraft than the Luftwaffe, and a home mover's advantage in that pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for a PoW camp if German). Finally, unlike the Lufwaffe, the RAF had the world's first integrated air defense network, with radar pickets to detect inbound bombers, control centres to direct the interceptors, and radio-directed fighters. The myth of the Spitfire is over-hyped because it's a lot simpler than the reality of the situation.

lucasjung 15y ago
>The RAF...had...a home mover's advantage in that pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for a PoW camp if German). Not just shot-down pilots: a battle-damaged British plane had a good chance of limping back to a safe landing (at an airstrip or even a country road), while a battle-damaged German plane had much lower chances of lasting long enough to land in German territory. Even when British planes were completely shot down, the wreckage could often be recovered and used for spare parts. The "Cactus Air Force" on Guadalcanal had similar advantages. >Finally, unlike the Lufwaffe, the RAF had the world's first integrated air defense network, with radar pickets to detect inbound bombers, control centres to direct the interceptors, and radio-directed fighters. People usually understand the more immediate advantages of this system ("get the jump on the enemy," etc.), but often miss the deeper implication: this was, if you'll pardon the use of a buzz-word, a true force multiplier. If they had not had their IADS, the British would have been forced to fly constant patrols all along their coastline, spreading themselves thin in an attempt to catch all of the incoming German forces. At the tactical level, their formations would have been outnumbered in most cases. At the strategic level, their crews and planes would have been worn out from ceaseless flying. Instead, they were able to keep most of their planes on the ground, with well-rested alert crews standing by, then concentrate large numbers of planes exactly where they were needed at exactly the right time.
podperson 15y ago
Thanks for pointing this out. The hurricane was also cheaper to make and easier to repair than the spitfire because of its wire and canvas construction.
- WalterBright 15y ago
  I read long ago that the Spitfire cost (in terms of labor hours) twice as much to produce as the Me-109, although the two airplanes had a rough parity in combat.
quanticle 15y ago
There's also the fact that the German air force was not structured to meet the challenge of mounting a long-term bombing campaign over hostile territory. The Luftwaffe's bomber force was structured to provide close air support bombing for advancing tank forces. Their bombers had neither the range nor the durability necessary to fly and fight for long periods of time over enemy territory. The entire Battle of Britain was a grievous strategic error by Goering.
- run4yourlives 15y ago
  I'm with you until that last line. If you look at what Germany was trying to do - invade the UK - then the only real course of action for them was to indeed launch the Battle of Britain. They had momentum, they were pressing the attack. While true that the Luftwaffe didn't have exactly the right equipment for a strategic bombing war (nobody did, actually, it wasn't perfected until the allies needed to do it), you're playing too much of a Monday Morning Quarterback blaming Goering. Strategically, the only mistake the Germans made during BB was to switch from targeting tactical targets to bombing cities. It's doubtful though if this really made much of a difference in the end. Fundamentally though, there was nothing overly wrong with the German approach to the BB. It was a tough assignment that they perhaps were a little overconfident in being able to pull off, but in the end, they just lost.
VladRussian 15y ago
in that regard it is interesting to see that Dambuster project was mentioned - technically brilliant, yet with very limited practical impact. The technical brilliance materialized in one piece of weapon doesn't win the war by default. Though, for sure it helps to keep your losses down or increase the losses of the enemy. Even A-bomb, if obtained by Hitler wouldn't win the war for him. Though, the losses of the anti-Hitler coalition would be much larger (on the scale of 5-20K military personnel / per bomb)
jodrellblank 15y ago
The Germans also had to fly all over France and the English Channel to get into British airspace, so they had limited fuel and fighting time. As the war progressed, Britain imported fuel with better and better quality, and had increasing horsepower, wheras the Germans supplies were limited and worsening. The RAF was structured so that pilots trained in the quiet northern zones, flew in the south for battle, then rotated through the quiet north for recouperation, the Germans flew their pilots into battle pretty much constantly, including new pilots. The British had airfields without concrete runways, so the German attack plan of bombing airfields out of action was useless - levelling the ground meant the airfield was back in action in a few hours. Briton had very high priority for aircraft repair, planes could arrive damaged, and be flying again the next day. These are all things I recall hearing on a recent TV show about the air-war of the time. German aircraft had more ammunition, better ammunition, and there was a big difference in numbers of planes, but their strategy, situation and luck was worse in too many ways.
m0nty 15y ago
> pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for a PoW camp if German) Hence the German pilots (against their better instincts) started shooting pilots who had bailed out. This was seen as "bad form" by both sides but the Germans knew that a British pilot who survived could be back in the air causing more problems for them later the same day.

by cstross 15y ago

lucasjung 15y ago

>The RAF...had...a home mover's advantage in that pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for a PoW camp if German). Not just shot-down pilots: a battle-damaged British plane had a good chance of limping back to a safe landing (at an airstrip or even a country road), while a battle-damaged German plane had much lower chances of lasting long enough to land in German territory. Even when British planes were completely shot down, the wreckage could often be recovered and used for spare parts. The "Cactus Air Force" on Guadalcanal had similar advantages. >Finally, unlike the Lufwaffe, the RAF had the world's first integrated air defense network, with radar pickets to detect inbound bombers, control centres to direct the interceptors, and radio-directed fighters. People usually understand the more immediate advantages of this system ("get the jump on the enemy," etc.), but often miss the deeper implication: this was, if you'll pardon the use of a buzz-word, a true force multiplier. If they had not had their IADS, the British would have been forced to fly constant patrols all along their coastline, spreading themselves thin in an attempt to catch all of the incoming German forces. At the tactical level, their formations would have been outnumbered in most cases. At the strategic level, their crews and planes would have been worn out from ceaseless flying. Instead, they were able to keep most of their planes on the ground, with well-rested alert crews standing by, then concentrate large numbers of planes exactly where they were needed at exactly the right time.

podperson 15y ago

Thanks for pointing this out. The hurricane was also cheaper to make and easier to repair than the spitfire because of its wire and canvas construction.

WalterBright 15y ago
I read long ago that the Spitfire cost (in terms of labor hours) twice as much to produce as the Me-109, although the two airplanes had a rough parity in combat.

quanticle 15y ago

There's also the fact that the German air force was not structured to meet the challenge of mounting a long-term bombing campaign over hostile territory. The Luftwaffe's bomber force was structured to provide close air support bombing for advancing tank forces. Their bombers had neither the range nor the durability necessary to fly and fight for long periods of time over enemy territory. The entire Battle of Britain was a grievous strategic error by Goering.

run4yourlives 15y ago
I'm with you until that last line. If you look at what Germany was trying to do - invade the UK - then the only real course of action for them was to indeed launch the Battle of Britain. They had momentum, they were pressing the attack. While true that the Luftwaffe didn't have exactly the right equipment for a strategic bombing war (nobody did, actually, it wasn't perfected until the allies needed to do it), you're playing too much of a Monday Morning Quarterback blaming Goering. Strategically, the only mistake the Germans made during BB was to switch from targeting tactical targets to bombing cities. It's doubtful though if this really made much of a difference in the end. Fundamentally though, there was nothing overly wrong with the German approach to the BB. It was a tough assignment that they perhaps were a little overconfident in being able to pull off, but in the end, they just lost.

VladRussian 15y ago

in that regard it is interesting to see that Dambuster project was mentioned - technically brilliant, yet with very limited practical impact. The technical brilliance materialized in one piece of weapon doesn't win the war by default. Though, for sure it helps to keep your losses down or increase the losses of the enemy. Even A-bomb, if obtained by Hitler wouldn't win the war for him. Though, the losses of the anti-Hitler coalition would be much larger (on the scale of 5-20K military personnel / per bomb)

jodrellblank 15y ago

The Germans also had to fly all over France and the English Channel to get into British airspace, so they had limited fuel and fighting time. As the war progressed, Britain imported fuel with better and better quality, and had increasing horsepower, wheras the Germans supplies were limited and worsening. The RAF was structured so that pilots trained in the quiet northern zones, flew in the south for battle, then rotated through the quiet north for recouperation, the Germans flew their pilots into battle pretty much constantly, including new pilots. The British had airfields without concrete runways, so the German attack plan of bombing airfields out of action was useless - levelling the ground meant the airfield was back in action in a few hours. Briton had very high priority for aircraft repair, planes could arrive damaged, and be flying again the next day. These are all things I recall hearing on a recent TV show about the air-war of the time. German aircraft had more ammunition, better ammunition, and there was a big difference in numbers of planes, but their strategy, situation and luck was worse in too many ways.

m0nty 15y ago

> pilots who were shot down ended up landing in the UK (able to go back into battle if British, but destined for a PoW camp if German) Hence the German pilots (against their better instincts) started shooting pilots who had bailed out. This was seen as "bad form" by both sides but the Germans knew that a British pilot who survived could be back in the air causing more problems for them later the same day.