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I will never understand what his line of thinking (and argumentation towards the board) was to go Windows-exclusively on phones. Back then, Windows had about 2

I will never understand what his line of thinking (and argumentation towards the board) was to go Windows-exclusively on phones. Back then, Windows had about 2% share in the mobile phone market. Betting literally Nokia's entire future on Windows Phone seemed reckless, given that the competition (most notably Samsung) was being so successful with Android. And this exclusivity was one-way: Nokia would commit to Windows Phone (or death), but Microsoft would continue to happily supply Windows Phone to Nokia's competitors, like Samsung. So while Samsung, HTC, and the others were building both Android and Windows Phone devices, Nokia was going to go down the Windows path exclusively. How was that ever supposed to work out? I look forward to reading this book, because Elop's decision bet Nokia's future on 2%-market-share-Microsoft is something that I have never understood. And I may be arm-chairing, but Nokia's demise went exactly as I expected it to go from day 1 of this announcement.

wwweston 6y ago
This, so much. Maybe Elop brought more to the table than meets the eye, but the Windows choice stinks so heavily given his history, Microsoft's history with OEMs, and the specifics of the deal that it almost doesn't really matter if there was some kind of logic that didn't make it out into the popular world. Nokia may have been in a bad position but like you, I anticipated the trajectory things took. If they were going to take the risk of trying to make any platform a third major player, it should have been one they owned the upside of. Failing that, buying into the Android ecosystem (maybe with a bid to extend it, bring in rockstar S60 emulation and/or better native Linux support) and competing on their hardware capabilities and reputation is the only thing that made sense.
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virgilp 6y ago
I also don't understand the line of reasoning 'Nokia had no choice, they were already way behind Android and iOS". Why, oh, why did Elop have to choose "differentiation"? Nokia could have simply said, "oh, so we all have the same OS[+] now? Fine. Let the best industrial design, carrier relations and manufacturing prowess win! Oh and BTW our phones come with offline navigation". WinMo was a _very_ risky bet with little upside and huge downside. [+] Android, ofc.

wwweston 6y ago

This, so much. Maybe Elop brought more to the table than meets the eye, but the Windows choice stinks so heavily given his history, Microsoft's history with OEMs, and the specifics of the deal that it almost doesn't really matter if there was some kind of logic that didn't make it out into the popular world. Nokia may have been in a bad position but like you, I anticipated the trajectory things took. If they were going to take the risk of trying to make any platform a third major player, it should have been one they owned the upside of. Failing that, buying into the Android ecosystem (maybe with a bid to extend it, bring in rockstar S60 emulation and/or better native Linux support) and competing on their hardware capabilities and reputation is the only thing that made sense.

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virgilp 6y ago

I also don't understand the line of reasoning 'Nokia had no choice, they were already way behind Android and iOS". Why, oh, why did Elop have to choose "differentiation"? Nokia could have simply said, "oh, so we all have the same OS[+] now? Fine. Let the best industrial design, carrier relations and manufacturing prowess win! Oh and BTW our phones come with offline navigation". WinMo was a _very_ risky bet with little upside and huge downside. [+] Android, ofc.