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Are you claiming that the Sequoia implementation of the OpenPGP standard is a "complicated old mess"? Because the OpenPGP standard (RFC 4880) isn't really all t

Are you claiming that the Sequoia implementation of the OpenPGP standard is a "complicated old mess"? Because the OpenPGP standard (RFC 4880) isn't really all that complicated. A significant portion of is a bit by bit description of the key format. At any rate, age is hardly any sort of replacement for OpenPGP. It is really only suitable for the case where you want to encrypt something like a backup and not bother to sign it. I am not really sure that it is superior even for that niche case. Most people would want to know a backup is corrupt before they started the restore, not partway through it.

viraptor 6y ago
In the out of scope section of the spec: > Any kind of signing (which is not a tooling problem, but a trust and key distribution problem, and to the extent that tools matter you should just use signify/minisign, and for keys we should probably use SSH ones) Yeah, they could implement it, but why not keep the utilities small and specific to a use case. You can shasum over the backup and sign it if that's what you want.
XMPPwocky 6y ago
> Most people would want to know a backup is corrupt before they started the restore, not partway through it. Yes, which often makes OpenPGP a bad choice, because of how it has to authenticate things (requiring multiple passes). Many implementations of OpenPGP will happily release unauthenticated plaintext to the caller (and then fail at the end when the MAC fails- too late if you piped that to tar!) - there isn't an efficient way to do better than this with OpenPGP, because...well, it isn't very good.