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My point specifically of mentioning Stuxnet is that it’s an impressive stack up of various complex exploits. They released a neutered, self-replicating version
by vlovich123 6y ago
My point specifically of mentioning Stuxnet is that it’s an impressive stack up of various complex exploits. They released a neutered, self-replicating version of the virus into the wild to mask their intrusion into Iran. The virus in the wild had all the code needed to attack Siemens microcontrollers for the reactor cooling (if I recall correctly) but it was neutered unless running in the Iranian reactor (imagine trying to write such code that would correctly detect the Iranian reactors). They then used social engineering to actually get a contracted on prem to infect the air gapped computers. This created confusion in the Iranian security services long enough that Iran was brought to the negotiating table for the nuclear deal.
My point here is that seemingly innocuous (or previously innocuous) methods can still be utilized. The overall attack is the thing that’s impressive (at least to me). Technical attacks are impressive. So are social ones. Ones that combine the two in novel ways to accomplish audacious goals can only be more so and having a view of “this isn’t a complete attack by itself and is therefore uninteresting” seems myopic to me. I’m more curious about how this could be leveraged to be a piece of an overall attack. For example, with very little time you could “permanently” compromise devices your victim has and spy on them without them knowing about it. Sure you don’t get C&C but if you’re just looking to monitor what’s happening may not be so bad.
I definitely agree with ops point that if this is a basic technique and just a routine transformation to apply to different sensors, academically this is not interesting and a corruption of the principles of scientific publishing. As a proof of concept though it’s still valuable because you are characterizing the bitrate you’re able to get from different sensor types.
- giantg2 6y agoIt's a valid concept, but the concept is already existing - infect a machine and have it blink a light or emit RF. I guess it isn't very interesting, for me, compared to passive side channel attacks (interpreting naturally generated RF). '“this isn’t a complete attack by itself and is therefore uninteresting” seems myopic to me' I think you are misunderstanding me. I do agree that how attacks are put together and coordinated is interesting. I just don't see much to get excited about for this exploit. So viewing this from a larger perspective... Most of the time if you are attacking air gapped systems for data exfil, the physical site will have security countermeasures, especially for RF. I would be more interested to see an exploit that doesn't use RF (at least not in the known data bands like wifi in this case) to rely data since RF is so scrutinized in the target setting. So my position isn't that I don't like it because it's not a full attack, it's that I don't like it because the author is basically recycling old ideas and I view this idea, for the intended use (air gapped data exfil), to be lacking when evaluated from a systems thinking perspective. It's like giving someone a knife and telling them to sneak into a secure facility with metal detectors to stab someone. Can it work? Sure, but probably not as well as other options. It isn't very imaginative either.