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> This intelligence, which we might call conceptualization, is not a cognitive process. The real intelligence is animal intelligence I can only partially see w

> This intelligence, which we might call conceptualization, is not a cognitive process. The real intelligence is animal intelligence I can only partially see what you mean exactly by "cognitive" or "animal" (with regards to intelligence), it doesn't seem like you use the words in their precisely common meanings. I also never claimed that intelligence is in its base cognitive. The original claim was that all of the intelligence is based in "ape-ish" motor skills, that it's basically their motor cortex that is just a little more advanced that gives rise to all the behaviors that we call intelligent. This idea would basically mean that a task such as writing and publicizing a great book such as Shakespeare's Hamlet (including accumulating all the life experience required to produce it, and make it being so good) - is "basically a motor skills task". This just doesn't make a lot of sense to me. While it does of course require motor skills like taking a pen and putting the words to the paper, it requires a lot more other complex skills as well that have so little to do with motor intelligence that I don't see any honest reason to put them in the same category. Thus, my comment that your theory requires expanding the concept of "psychomotor" to such extent that the word loses all of its useful meaning. > political correctness = criteria for the fit of my body with other bodies as we want from each other It's just not a good explanation, it loses 90% of all of the intricacies. Try using it to explain it to someone who doesn't know what political correctness is- it doesn't do the job.

mjburgess 6y ago
> cognitive I just mean any system of inference over propositions, or anything which looks like it . We are told our frontal lobe is the most unique aspect of our brains: not true! Our motor cortex is. We are the only animal which learns almost all skills after-birth, via our significant and adaptable motor cortex. > Try using it to explain it to someone Yes, concepts need to be converted/reduced to propositional (and then linguistic) forms in order to be cognized and then to be communicated. You can't really acquire a novel basic concept via communication, but you can acquire metaconcepts (like criteria for things) which are just combinations of basic concepts you have already learnt (ie., motor concepts). I'm not saying that there is no propositional content to concepts, ie., that they fail in being instances of some abstract Form. I am saying, rather, what they are; and how we acquire them. I have significant doubts that the world can be conceptualised by mere cognition, ie., that the contents of an inferential process can be arrived at via an inferential process. I think this is an illusion: and it is apparent with machines. There is no mechanism for their understanding what they are processing. We aren't aware, i'd say, at all, of how we actually conceptualise the world. All we're aware of, as far as our intelligence goes, is inference(/cognition). (Though many greats have attributed mysterious immediate insights to the divine: rather it is just their actual intelligence). I think that sets us up for a highly misleading paradigm of intelligence (cf. Cartesian dualism, etc. )

mjburgess 6y ago

> cognitive I just mean any system of inference over propositions, or anything which looks like it . We are told our frontal lobe is the most unique aspect of our brains: not true! Our motor cortex is. We are the only animal which learns almost all skills after-birth, via our significant and adaptable motor cortex. > Try using it to explain it to someone Yes, concepts need to be converted/reduced to propositional (and then linguistic) forms in order to be cognized and then to be communicated. You can't really acquire a novel basic concept via communication, but you can acquire metaconcepts (like criteria for things) which are just combinations of basic concepts you have already learnt (ie., motor concepts). I'm not saying that there is no propositional content to concepts, ie., that they fail in being instances of some abstract Form. I am saying, rather, what they are; and how we acquire them. I have significant doubts that the world can be conceptualised by mere cognition, ie., that the contents of an inferential process can be arrived at via an inferential process. I think this is an illusion: and it is apparent with machines. There is no mechanism for their understanding what they are processing. We aren't aware, i'd say, at all, of how we actually conceptualise the world. All we're aware of, as far as our intelligence goes, is inference(/cognition). (Though many greats have attributed mysterious immediate insights to the divine: rather it is just their actual intelligence). I think that sets us up for a highly misleading paradigm of intelligence (cf. Cartesian dualism, etc. )