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> You’re not going to turn the business off because somebody’s inbox got compromised, or because there’s some unexplained event in the SIEM, duh, those get han
by 35fbe7d3d5b9 6y ago
> You’re not going to turn the business off because somebody’s inbox got compromised, or because there’s some unexplained event in the SIEM,
duh, those get handled several pages before "press the red button" is even discussed. You think "turn off the business" is the only page in the playbook?!
> and those are the sort of events you’re actually going to have to respond to.
Tell that to SolarWinds.
You need a IR plan that has appropriate responses to the threats you are facing. But at the scale and impact of a company like SolarWinds it's actually rather reassuring to have a "stop the world" backstop because your threat model absolutely includes catastrophic levels of risk.
And "you won't be incentivized to push the button"? Come on. When things get to "state level adversary on your network, using your software to attack DHS and the Treasury" bad, you're going to absolutely push the button because in a few months when your CEO is answering questions in Congress they'll want to be able to talk about something that went right.
- AmericanChopper 6y agoIn the real world, you're never going to know that you have a "state level adversary on your network, using your software to attack DHS and the Treasury" until after all the damage has already been done, and you've had enough time to assess the total impact. That's presuming you're even alerted to it in a timely manner. In that scenario, the appropriate response almost certainly not going to be "turn off the business" and even if it is, it's not going to matter whether you can do it in 5 minutes or 5 hours. The only scenarios in which you'll have enough information to justify activating this plan, are scenarios where you'll also have enough information to respond to the actual threat, rather than just shutting everything down. It's something that might sound impressive to people who aren't experienced with incident response, but it's practical uses are so close to non-existent, that any time that was spent developing this solution was most certainly wasted in lieu of doing something actually useful.