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First, FireEye was one of the companies who worked to secure Equifax prior to the breach as mentioned by the CSO of Equifax on page 4 of this FireEye white pape
by Veserv 6y ago
First, FireEye was one of the companies who worked to secure Equifax prior to the breach as mentioned by the CSO of Equifax on page 4 of this FireEye white paper from 2012 [1] that FireEye has since retracted [2][3].
Second, that is kind of a non-sequitur. I did not say that a nation-state did not pull off the attack, my gripe is that they are implying, like every other company that gets breached, that only a nation-state has the resources to pull off such an attack with their wording. These attacks are extremely cheap and easy, that is why we see governments running literally hundreds to thousands of such attacks/programs in parallel as evidenced by the CIA Vault 7 leaks. A single branch of the US government was literally developing hundreds of independent tools/programs that could successfully compromise anything they cared to target.
Third, define "easy". I define easy as ~$1,000,000-$10,000,000 since almost any moderately-sized corporation, of which there are millions, could fund such an operation. To put it in perspective, $10,000,000 is only ~1% of FireEye's revenue. I define "only a nation-state" at 1,000x more at ~$1,000,000,000-~$10,000,000,000 since although it is still technically doable for a large multinational or organized crime, it is unlikely to be profitable outside of theoretical large-scale extortion attacks.
Do you think a penetration test of 3 engineers working fulltime for a year would fail to materially breach FireEye's corporate systems? Almost every penetration test by a competent company takes a fraction of that effort even against well-funded security teams. And 3 engineers for one year is only 3 engineer-years which at $300k/engineer-year is ~$1,000,000, the bottom end of "easy" and 1,000x less than "only nation-states can pull it off". If engineer-years is too abstract, the Google ProjectZero case I mentioned earlier was a zero-click iOS RCE from zero starting understanding in 0.5 engineer-years. So, doing some sloppy extrapolation, is it easier to find 6 zero-click iOS RCEs or breach FireEye's corporate systems?
Let's say we moved up an order of magnitude to 1% of FireEye's revenue at $10,000,000 which is the high end of "easy" and is 2 orders of magnitude less than the bottom end of "only nation-states can pull it off". That would be enough to fund 30 engineers working fulltime for a year or 10 engineers working fulltime for 3 years. Do you think FireEye could prevent a material breach? I have literally never heard of a single person in enterprise security who has ever dared to make such a remark on the record that was not instantly taken down for a fraction of that. I know of no competent engineers in that space who would support making such a statement to anybody who could and would test it. Just think if FireEye announced a $10,000,000 prize at DefCon to breach their systems by the end of the year, do you think they would even last the month?
[1] http://www.cnmeonline.com/myresources/fireeye/fireeye-cso-less-secure-than-you-think.pdf http://www.cnmeonline.com/myresources/fireeye/fireeye-cso-le...
[2] https://web.archive.org/web/20120610031926/https://www.fireeye.com/CSO_WP_LP.html https://web.archive.org/web/20120610031926/https://www.firee...
[3] https://www.fireeye.com/CSO_WP_LP.html https://www.fireeye.com/CSO_WP_LP.html
- wglb 6y ago>my gripe is that they are implying, like every other company that gets breached, that only a nation-state has the resources to pull off such an attack with their wording. I feel that with respect to FireEye, that it isn't just an implication; more that they would claim this with strong evidence. They are about attribution. I think this argument is making some false equivalence. Just because every other company that was breached (e.g. Equifax) claims "Wow State Actor Sophisticate Beyond Anything Before Seen By Man" for something as simple as failure to update your software leaves a yawning hole has tarnished the dialog for those who know what they are doing. While CSO at Relativity, and now for my clients, I strongly suggest that you don't use the phrase "Security is Very Important to us" since that is the first thing out of the mouth of companies who didn't until they got hacked. >Do you think a penetration test of 3 engineers working fulltime for a year would fail to materially breach FireEye's corporate systems? Bluntly, yes. I expect that their defenses are much better than most companies, including security companies. >I have literally never heard of a single person in enterprise security who has ever dared to make such a remark on the record Enterprise security is in a different category altogether. Few non-security enterprises will withstand much of an attack. FireEye is in a different category altogether. If you are interested in the topic, a useful book to read is https://www.amazon.com/Incident-Response-Computer-Forensics-Third/dp/0071798684 https://www.amazon.com/Incident-Response-Computer-Forensics-.... I think this is more informative than these BOEC cost calculations.
- Veserv 6y agoFireEye literally did the incident response for the Equifax hack, so I do not see how you can claim: "FireEye does accurate and honest attribution." but then also claim "Equifax likely made stuff up." unless you are claiming that FireEye was involved in incident response, but was somehow not involved in attribution, or that they made a true discovery-able report, but knowingly lied. It is hardly a false equivalence. If everybody constantly fails with little to no evidence of any success by anyone ever despite continuous assurances of success by everyone, there is exactly zero evidence that a layperson should trust any statement on that topic without good, solid, objective evidence to the contrary. Given the track record in the industry, there is no reason to give the benefit of the doubt to any company. The burden of proof is on them to demonstrate their claims in a relatively objective, quantitative manner. If they have no means of proving a quantitative claim in a relatively objective manner, there is no reason to believe their claims given their track record. To provide an analogy, if somebody you trust to not be malicious asks you to follow them, but they can not justify why, then the smart thing to do is judge them based on their track record as that provides some part of an objective statistical basis for evaluating their prevailing success rate. If you really must have evidence of a trend of insecurity amongst security companies. Then we can look no further than McAfee, Symantec, and Trend Micro all being breached between 2017-2019 that was attributed to "fxmsp" [1][2], a private Russian hacking group that was selling the contents of the breaches for a few $100k which demonstrates how easy it must have been for it to be profitable at that price point (to be fair they could sell it multiple times, but I doubt they sold it hundreds of times). So, what justification do you have for why FireEye's security should be any different than other companies or even other security companies? Also, you only provided an answer to the low end of "easy" rather than the high end at 30 engineers for a year or 10 engineers for 3 years which would be needed to pull them out of the "easy" category by my standards. If you do claim they can survive that, can you provide either some reasonably quantitative evidence or public statements to that effect or the same for literally any other company in the world you think can do so as I have not once ever heard of a single company ever justifying such a claim in any verifiable manner. Thank you. [1] https://gdpr.report/news/2019/05/15/mcafeesymantec-trend-micro-breached-by-russian-hacking-group/ https://gdpr.report/news/2019/05/15/mcafeesymantec-trend-mic... [2] https://www.zdnet.com/article/fxmsp-hacker-indicted-by-feds-for-selling-network-access-impacting-hundreds-of-companies/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/fxmsp-hacker-indicted-by-feds-...