3 ms·
Why encrypt the first hop? Why isn't this just plain DoH with a simple CONNECT forward proxy to 1.1.1.1, like Signal's Giphy proxy [1]? [1] https://signal.org/
by geogriffin 6y ago
Why encrypt the first hop? Why isn't this just plain DoH with a simple CONNECT forward proxy to 1.1.1.1, like Signal's Giphy proxy [1]?
[1] https://signal.org/blog/signal-and-giphy-update/ https://signal.org/blog/signal-and-giphy-update/
- pcwrt 6y agoTotally agree. Just posted my own question here: https://www.pcwrt.com/2020/12/oblivious-dns-over-https-vs-doh-through-http-proxy/ https://www.pcwrt.com/2020/12/oblivious-dns-over-https-vs-do...
- geogriffin 6y agoAnswering my own question.. A cryptographer friend offered an answer to this question: The network operator may be the same as or colluding with the target resolver, defeating the anonymization of the proxy. Once we say we need encryption on the first hop, then I can see the logic in using a stateless protocol instead of TLS for the second hop, to avoid TLS-in-TLS and all the round trips associated with that. Side note: It'd be cool if these new protocols used the more generic Noise Protocol Framework [1] instead of a custom, more specialized protocol they just came up with like HPKE [2]. [1] http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html http://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html [2] https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-06.txt https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-hpke-06.txt