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1. "Boeing + Airbus have a very very very vested interest in making sure that aviation is safe, and appears very safe" 2. "Boeing did lie about shit. Middle ma

1. "Boeing + Airbus have a very very very vested interest in making sure that aviation is safe, and appears very safe" 2. "Boeing did lie about shit. Middle management pushed some real bullshit with the max." So how are these two things squared? I'd say clearly Boeing has other interests which compete with safety, like profit. The difference between "appears safe" and "is safe" can be profitably "arbitraged", until you mess up and get caught. It doesn't seem their very very very vested interest in making sure aviation is safe was sufficient to replace outside supervision after all.

redis_mlc 6y ago
In the interest of clarity: - Boeing was trying to avoid a $1 million penalty per plane to Southwest if pilot re-training was needed (Southwest buys 737's for commonality to reduce Mx and training costs) - This perverse incentive resulted in several groups inside Boeing not understanding each other on how to do that, complicated by the MCAS system consisting of both hardware and software (outsourced) intersecting with compliance. Very few employees in any organization can be on top of several areas, and be able to communicate across those areas. - A bad design (only one AoA sensor used out of two) that probably had on-going revisions, and incorrect paperwork filed with the FAA - a culture of fear, where reporting a problem meant a high risk of being fired (the test pilots knew there was a problem and sent SMS messages about it, their manager knew it. In the end, the manager was fired after the SMS messages were made public because PR.) The ODM FAA contractors are also under pressure not to affect schedules at Boeing or they also have been fired in the past. The similarities I read between the Grenfell Tower and 737 MAX disasters were that employees knew there was a safety problem (fire vs. loss of control), and the certification paperwork was misleading (fire rating vs. MCAS pitch-down rate and frequency.) I wouldn't describe the 737 MAX issue as directly a profit-motivated defect. Yes, larger engines required MCAS, and delays reduce profits, but a correct MCAS design and certification paperwork would have cost the same initially as what was delivered - that didn't work.

redis_mlc 6y ago

In the interest of clarity: - Boeing was trying to avoid a $1 million penalty per plane to Southwest if pilot re-training was needed (Southwest buys 737's for commonality to reduce Mx and training costs) - This perverse incentive resulted in several groups inside Boeing not understanding each other on how to do that, complicated by the MCAS system consisting of both hardware and software (outsourced) intersecting with compliance. Very few employees in any organization can be on top of several areas, and be able to communicate across those areas. - A bad design (only one AoA sensor used out of two) that probably had on-going revisions, and incorrect paperwork filed with the FAA - a culture of fear, where reporting a problem meant a high risk of being fired (the test pilots knew there was a problem and sent SMS messages about it, their manager knew it. In the end, the manager was fired after the SMS messages were made public because PR.) The ODM FAA contractors are also under pressure not to affect schedules at Boeing or they also have been fired in the past. The similarities I read between the Grenfell Tower and 737 MAX disasters were that employees knew there was a safety problem (fire vs. loss of control), and the certification paperwork was misleading (fire rating vs. MCAS pitch-down rate and frequency.) I wouldn't describe the 737 MAX issue as directly a profit-motivated defect. Yes, larger engines required MCAS, and delays reduce profits, but a correct MCAS design and certification paperwork would have cost the same initially as what was delivered - that didn't work.