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I have started to look at a model where the device itself is the password. How often do we realistically need to concern ourselves with the scenario where multi
by bob1029 6y ago
I have started to look at a model where the device itself is the password. How often do we realistically need to concern ourselves with the scenario where multiple users are utilizing the same physical device in 2020?
Imagine every device has a cookie/token with 256-512 CSPRNG bytes which uniquely identify it. The server uses this as the exclusive means of authentication. For sensitive application scenarios, an in-app PIN mechanism can be used as a soft protective measure (e.g. Robinhood mobile apps use this). The device you initially sign up on can be used to activate additional devices by way of scanning a QR code, offline recovery codes, SMS, etc.
This model makes it so that a user has no username or password to remember. They just need to make sure they have a backup device and/or offline recovery options available. I find that side-stepping the problem altogether might be the best solution for all involved. Users loathe remembering passwords. Developers screw up password hashing constantly. Malicious actors should grow to strongly dislike this approach.
This also provides a much stricter chain of custody over how additional devices are added to an account. You have to already have a trusted device to bring another. Making the "What you have" (device) the first factor, and the "What you know" (i.e. pin code) the second factor seems to work out a lot better looking forward.
- kavi87 6y agoThat's pretty much the webauthn specification that is already available in most major browsers.
- Sohcahtoa82 6y ago> They just need to make sure they have a backup device and/or offline recovery options available. There's the hard part. Go to the World of Warcraft forums and ask how many people have had trouble dealing with identity verification with Blizzard because they lost or destroyed their phone and no longer have access to the Blizzard Authenticator app and are therefore locked out of their account. Sure, the app will give you backup codes you can use to restore the Authenticator on a new device, but clearly very few people are actually recording those somewhere. > Developers screw up password hashing constantly. Developers should know better. There's no excuse for continuing to use poor/no hashing for password storage. > Malicious actors should grow to strongly dislike this approach. Not as much as you think. Considering how many people still think that fingerprints are secure, if stealing someone's device means having access to everything they have, then "your device is your password" is flawed. PINs and swipe patterns are trivial to shoulder surf.