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The DC-10 recovered. It was grounded, returned to service, crashed again. Eventually, it became safe. And eventually the public forgot about the issues. The bi
by outworlder 6y ago
The DC-10 recovered. It was grounded, returned to service, crashed again. Eventually, it became safe. And eventually the public forgot about the issues.
The bigger problem is that you have a company that decided that a single sensor driving a safety-critical system was sufficient, even though they have two (and even that is not enough, such systems should have three).
For a new system that was introduced and not explained to pilots, because that was the goal. It even made the "AOA disagree" warning _an optional feature_. Or, more specifically, it made the AOA indicator an optional feature, and the AOA disagree feature was tied to that. They knew about it, but didn't inform anyone. Including the FAA.
So now we trust that same company to make the plane safe. Why?
- adamredwoods 6y agoI never knew, thanks for the information: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_191
- foldr 6y agoTo be fair, it makes sense that the AOA indicator/disagree features were optional since airliners generally don't have AOI indicators in the cockpit and airline pilots generally aren't trained to use AOA information. These features were targeted at airlines who have lots of ex-military pilots. Their potential safety significance is probably more obvious in retrospect.