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> Offline+subkey PGP is about enabling a root of trust that isn't exposed by exploits. Forward secrecy is about deliberately and frequently changing keys so tha
by lmm 6y ago
> Offline+subkey PGP is about enabling a root of trust that isn't exposed by exploits. Forward secrecy is about deliberately and frequently changing keys so that a point-in-time compromise can't be used to rewind all your previous communications. They are not the same thing.
Subkeys aren't exclusively about having your root be offline, that's just one use case. Yes, you can have a long-lived subkey and a super-long-lived root key, but you can also have short-lived subkeys and a regular-length root key; indeed to a computer there's very little difference between those timescales.
> Regarding deniable messages: the ability for an unrelated Mallory to confirm a message Alice sent to Bob is a vulnerability. It leaks a piece of information to the world that only Alice and Bob needed, and that both needed only for a brief moment in time.
That depends entirely on what Alice and Bob were doing and what their expectations were. If Bob received an authenticated message from Alice and expects to be able to prove as much, not being able to do so is every bit as big a vulnerability as any other.
- tptacek 6y agoNon-deniable messages plainly leak information. Alice knows Bob's message is valid the moment she receives it (if she's running a serious protocol with Bob --- no comment if she's using the PGP MDC), and from that point on no longer needs the authentication on Bob's message. Neither Bob nor anyone else need to validate Bob's message; Bob sent the message and knows its plaintext bit-for-bit; "anyone else" isn't a party to the conversation. We design cryptosytems to minimize what "anyone else" gets. Non-deniable messages fail that test. What you're giving is a rationalization people use, to defend PGP and, recently, to argue that mail spool compromises are in the public interest, and should produce publicly verifiable logs. In reality, when Alice and Bob agree to produce verifiable, non-deniable messages to each other, they do so explicitly, not inadvertently, which is what is happening when your messaging system does that signing for you.
- lmm 6y agoDisagree; the very term "signing" gives an intuition of casual, reflexive but nonetheless non-repuidable authentication, and that's the behaviour that ordinary people would expect from a system for exchanging written messages. (Which is not to say it's the best possible set of tradeoffs, but it's a legitimate design).
- tptacek 6y agoLeaking information to strangers to satisfy message board rationalizations isn't a legitimate design. There's really no design that I believe someone on a message board couldn't come up with a way to call "legitimate". But one way is bad, the other is better; that's engineering.