3 ms·
Signal messages are repudiable which is not "better" but different, and probably more appropriate to a chat-like use cases. Signal rotates keys automatically;
by lmm 6y ago
Signal messages are repudiable which is not "better" but different, and probably more appropriate to a chat-like use cases.
Signal rotates keys automatically; a good OpenPGP client would do the same (using the subkey support that the protocol has), but the UX for that is completely missing in most clients.
Signal has a much smaller protocol surface (fixed algorithms etc.) and has properly robust HMAC-style message authentication, whereas OpenPGP relies on a bolted-on MDC construction.
Downsides are that there's no web-of-trust support from the protocol (OpenPGP still requires you to agree what signing someone's key with a given trust level represents, but it gives you more tools to build your processes on), and that the (nominally untrusted) server's involvement is pretty complex (particularly in the first-message case) but tends to get left out of protocol analysis.
- tptacek 6y agoLack of deniability is strictly a downside in a messaging protocol. Applications built on top of messaging protocols that want non-repudiability can provide it directly, using signatures. You almost never want non-repudiable messages between ordinary people. Later I also dispute that subkeys are reasonably looked at as a forward secrecy feature. Most uses of subkeys, and virtually all of the tooling, are about having a hardware root of trust tied to shorter-term software keys.
- lmm 6y ago> Lack of deniability is strictly a downside in a messaging protocol. Applications built on top of messaging protocols that want non-repudiability can provide it directly, using signatures. You almost never want non-repudiable messages between ordinary people. A protocol where messages are both authenticated and repudiable is pretty confusing to ordinary people; in real life most forms of identity authentication (e.g. wet-ink signatures, government ID cards) are non-repuidable. In any case for ordinary people the whole question is moot, because actual in-practice repuidability relies on regularly publishing old session keys etc. in a way that ordinary people don't, because the UX is nowhere near good enough (and may never be). > I also dispute that subkeys are reasonably looked at as a forward secrecy feature. Most uses of subkeys, and virtually all of the tooling, are about having a hardware root of trust tied to shorter-term software keys. I don't see that there's any contradiction between that and the forward secrecy use case? A root of trust tied to shorter-term keys (that are destroyed in due course) is exactly what you need for forward secrecy.
- tptacek 6y agoIn reverse order: Offline+subkey PGP is about enabling a root of trust that isn't exposed by exploits. Forward secrecy is about deliberately and frequently changing keys so that a point-in-time compromise can't be used to rewind all your previous communications. They are not the same thing. In particular: offline keys make it much harder to switch keys, which is exactly what you don't want. I don't think it's reasonable to suggest that the OpenPGP protocol contains the bones of a forward secrecy system --- it does not, it's just something people talk about grafting onto it. Regarding deniable messages: the ability for an unrelated Mallory to confirm a message Alice sent to Bob is a vulnerability. It leaks a piece of information to the world that only Alice and Bob needed, and that both needed only for a brief moment in time. In the real world, nobody pays any attention to any of this stuff, which makes the vulnerability worse: non-repudiability is virtually always moot except in the circumstances where you need it not to exist.
- lmm 6y ago> Offline+subkey PGP is about enabling a root of trust that isn't exposed by exploits. Forward secrecy is about deliberately and frequently changing keys so that a point-in-time compromise can't be used to rewind all your previous communications. They are not the same thing. Subkeys aren't exclusively about having your root be offline, that's just one use case. Yes, you can have a long-lived subkey and a super-long-lived root key, but you can also have short-lived subkeys and a regular-length root key; indeed to a computer there's very little difference between those timescales. > Regarding deniable messages: the ability for an unrelated Mallory to confirm a message Alice sent to Bob is a vulnerability. It leaks a piece of information to the world that only Alice and Bob needed, and that both needed only for a brief moment in time. That depends entirely on what Alice and Bob were doing and what their expectations were. If Bob received an authenticated message from Alice and expects to be able to prove as much, not being able to do so is every bit as big a vulnerability as any other.
- tptacek 6y agoNon-deniable messages plainly leak information. Alice knows Bob's message is valid the moment she receives it (if she's running a serious protocol with Bob --- no comment if she's using the PGP MDC), and from that point on no longer needs the authentication on Bob's message. Neither Bob nor anyone else need to validate Bob's message; Bob sent the message and knows its plaintext bit-for-bit; "anyone else" isn't a party to the conversation. We design cryptosytems to minimize what "anyone else" gets. Non-deniable messages fail that test. What you're giving is a rationalization people use, to defend PGP and, recently, to argue that mail spool compromises are in the public interest, and should produce publicly verifiable logs. In reality, when Alice and Bob agree to produce verifiable, non-deniable messages to each other, they do so explicitly, not inadvertently, which is what is happening when your messaging system does that signing for you.