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This argument is fallacious. Your argument assumes that “blaming the gun” is condoning the users, and this is a false dilemma. There’s really no room for absol

This argument is fallacious. Your argument assumes that “blaming the gun” is condoning the users, and this is a false dilemma. There’s really no room for absolutism, where blame is assigned to one source rather than distributed among many contributing factors. Imagine how dangerous air travel would still be if, after an accident, investigators looked for only one cause to blame, and tacitly condoned anything else they came across in their investigations.

throwaway0a5e 6y ago
>This argument is fallacious. Re-read my comment. My point is that fault is distributed sufficiently that accountability seems to evaporate. This is a systemic or organizational problem. Anti-cheating software is just the form this specific instance has taken. >Your argument assumes that “blaming the gun” is condoning the users Well until now you weren't throwing even the slightest bit of shade in their direction. >and this is a false dilemma. And you've created a false middle ground. >Imagine how dangerous air travel would still be if, after an accident, investigators looked for only one cause to blame, and tacitly condoned anything else they came across in their investigations. What's the difference between "dangerous harmful cheating software" and "cheating software that's being shoehorned into use cases in which it was never expected to be used"? That's why you don't blame the (metaphorical) gun. Everything is just tools. The FAA doesn't go off half cocked about the evils of grade-2 fasteners because once upon a time an engineer thought a grade-2 would be enough when he should have used a grade-5. I can't believe I have to defend (invasive to the point of being unethical) anti cheating software but these sorts of software tools are just tools and can be used either wisely or poorly. The software doesn't know or care how it's being used. In an industrial setting they can (and are, same underlying tech different companies) be used to design more effective interfaces to reduce errors (which I think we would all agree is a net positive contribution to the world).
- klodolph 6y ago
  > Re-read my comment. Stopped reading at that point, cheers.

throwaway0a5e 6y ago

>This argument is fallacious. Re-read my comment. My point is that fault is distributed sufficiently that accountability seems to evaporate. This is a systemic or organizational problem. Anti-cheating software is just the form this specific instance has taken. >Your argument assumes that “blaming the gun” is condoning the users Well until now you weren't throwing even the slightest bit of shade in their direction. >and this is a false dilemma. And you've created a false middle ground. >Imagine how dangerous air travel would still be if, after an accident, investigators looked for only one cause to blame, and tacitly condoned anything else they came across in their investigations. What's the difference between "dangerous harmful cheating software" and "cheating software that's being shoehorned into use cases in which it was never expected to be used"? That's why you don't blame the (metaphorical) gun. Everything is just tools. The FAA doesn't go off half cocked about the evils of grade-2 fasteners because once upon a time an engineer thought a grade-2 would be enough when he should have used a grade-5. I can't believe I have to defend (invasive to the point of being unethical) anti cheating software but these sorts of software tools are just tools and can be used either wisely or poorly. The software doesn't know or care how it's being used. In an industrial setting they can (and are, same underlying tech different companies) be used to design more effective interfaces to reduce errors (which I think we would all agree is a net positive contribution to the world).

klodolph 6y ago
> Re-read my comment. Stopped reading at that point, cheers.