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Messaging apps such as WA or Signal have no means of verifying keys, require phone numbers tied to the users’ real identity, operate based on a client-server mo

by aborsy 6y ago

Messaging apps such as WA or Signal have no means of verifying keys, require phone numbers tied to the users’ real identity, operate based on a client-server model in which the server could be compromised by well-resourced agencies and require black-box phones that are not secure against phone manufacturers and agencies with whom they collaborate. Users should be warned of perils of phones not quite under their control. Set up a proper FOSS machine that you understand, and use own encryption (be it PGP or some other tool serving the same purpose).

kmwyard 6y ago
Signal requires phone numbers because of taking care of users' privacy. Signal's choice to require a phone number is due to storing a contact list on a local machine to protect users' metadata. And PGP is never as secure as Signal or Other Encrypted Messenger (WhatsApp). Many Cryptographers blamed about weak security of PGP (https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted...., https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/13/whats-matter-with-pgp/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/13/whats-ma..., https://blog.filippo.io/giving-up-on-long-term-pgp/ https://blog.filippo.io/giving-up-on-long-term-pgp/) and even Edward Snowden doesn't use it now (https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1175437588129308672 https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1175437588129308672).
- deepstack 6y ago
  They could also just ask for an email, like wire does. Edit: or generate a UUID type random string for each new device.
  - kmwyard 6y ago
    This is because unlike Signal, the wire store user contact is on the server. (https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvzw5x/secure-messaging-app-wire-stores-everyone-youve-ever-contacted-in-plain-text https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvzw5x/secure-messaging-app-...)
- SahAssar 6y ago
  Why wouldn't signal be able to store local data without a phone number? Your argument seems like a red herring.
bertman 6y ago
>or Signal have no means of verifying keys To be fair, you've always been able to verify safety numbers (i.e. fingerprints i.e. public key hashes). https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/ https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/
- aborsy 6y ago
  Verifying a public key over a secure channel works trivially for any public key cryptography system. I was referring to ways to establish such secure secondary channels. Either verify a key yourself, eg, in person, or use distributed trust to average out the noise. For example, keybase has an approach: linking various identity information to keys. Signal is secure in a strange narrow interpretation of the security. There are problems if you look more broadly.

by aborsy 6y ago

kmwyard 6y ago

Signal requires phone numbers because of taking care of users' privacy. Signal's choice to require a phone number is due to storing a contact list on a local machine to protect users' metadata. And PGP is never as secure as Signal or Other Encrypted Messenger (WhatsApp). Many Cryptographers blamed about weak security of PGP (https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html, https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted.html https://latacora.micro.blog/2020/02/19/stop-using-encrypted...., https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/13/whats-matter-with-pgp/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/08/13/whats-ma..., https://blog.filippo.io/giving-up-on-long-term-pgp/ https://blog.filippo.io/giving-up-on-long-term-pgp/) and even Edward Snowden doesn't use it now (https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1175437588129308672 https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1175437588129308672).

deepstack 6y ago
They could also just ask for an email, like wire does. Edit: or generate a UUID type random string for each new device.
- kmwyard 6y ago
  This is because unlike Signal, the wire store user contact is on the server. (https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvzw5x/secure-messaging-app-wire-stores-everyone-youve-ever-contacted-in-plain-text https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvzw5x/secure-messaging-app-...)
SahAssar 6y ago
Why wouldn't signal be able to store local data without a phone number? Your argument seems like a red herring.

bertman 6y ago

>or Signal have no means of verifying keys To be fair, you've always been able to verify safety numbers (i.e. fingerprints i.e. public key hashes). https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/ https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/

aborsy 6y ago
Verifying a public key over a secure channel works trivially for any public key cryptography system. I was referring to ways to establish such secure secondary channels. Either verify a key yourself, eg, in person, or use distributed trust to average out the noise. For example, keybase has an approach: linking various identity information to keys. Signal is secure in a strange narrow interpretation of the security. There are problems if you look more broadly.