7 ms·
Zero trust, so... what about the chips in your system? What about the certificate authorities that Microsoft, Mozilla, Apple, or Google deliver to your system?
by lucb1e 6y ago
Zero trust, so... what about the chips in your system? What about the certificate authorities that Microsoft, Mozilla, Apple, or Google deliver to your system?
It's a nice thing to say but it doesn't work, at least not as a oneliner without further explanation of how you think this could work.
- vaccinator 6y agozero trust means no computer devices around you... (including TVs, toasters, etc...)
- machinelabo 6y agoYou trust your can of baked beans? The entire society runs on the concept of trust. At some point, you're gonna have to trust someone.
- hutzlibu 6y agoTrue. But I like to reinforce my trust with open and verifiable information. Meaning, I would prefer the can of baked beans from a company that is open about where their beans come from and in what conditions. That would be possible today, and is already done to some extend but in early stages. But getting your food from the local farmer, where you can actually visit the farm, it is much more easy to trust that it is good. And regarding software, well - open source, preferably with a open community (or company) around it, where you can at least look through the actual dev logs and git submits to see if they sound solid and if you have the time and skills, jump into it to verify that they do as promised. Then I can have trust. Otherwise the trust would have to be blind. And society has spoiled that for me, for various reasons.
- machinelabo 6y agoHuh? That's why we have regulations. Every country has one, in the US it is the FDA. Please don't try to shoehorn open source principles everywhere in life. It becomes a chore and a burden for a common citizen to verify the hazards of Baked Beans. Citizens offload this to a regulatory agency. You don't have the time to verify a fucking can of baked beans like a million other things in life. If you buy a measuring tape, do you ask for a NIST certificate? Where does the chain of trust end? Somewhere at the measurement standards in the pyramid of trust. Your personal role in this chain ends at the brand name "STANLEY", because you trust them to make a measuring tape that measures within specified tolerance. The whole movement around "I don't trust unless the information is freely available" is a pipe dream. It grinds the society to a halt. I urge you to look around 99% things in life that you just blindly trust. We need better mechanisms for building trust than "Don't trust unless verified". It is applicable in high risk situations, but the society pays a huge price for such an inefficient way to live.
- hutzlibu 6y agoHow do you know what things I trust blindly? But I agree, it is not efficient to question everything. I do not want to question everything! But I do know enough, to question a lot of things. Secrecy just allows bad things to stay hidden. If the default would be openness, then people who do bad things would hesitate more, as it would be easier to detect those things, don't you think? Whether it be government, food production or software.
- machinelabo 6y agoI think one common theme we both can agree is that open available data only helps. It doesn't take away from anything. For those who want to verify, they can. They can look up FDA reports and inspection results. Transparency builds trust overtime.
- hutzlibu 6y ago"Transparency builds trust overtime." Yep. This is what I mean. I come from east germany, a former post sowjet state. A state which was build on blind trust on the state and no way for the common person to verify anything (or even dare to question anything openly). And big surprise: lots of dark things happened regulary. Now things are still far from perfect in my opinion, but much, much better. And I think they can still improve a lot with even more transparency, because there are still lots of dark things happening behind closed doors. We probably just disagree on the degree of those things.
- Spooky23 6y agoFear and trust are not the same.
- tsimionescu 6y ago> A state which was build on blind trust on the state The former Soviet states and other USSR satellites were not built on trust, they were built on force. You had to act like you trusted the state to avoid the repressive force of the state. But people did not trust the state at all, much more so than in today's world. Everyone assumed their telephones were listened to. Everyone assumed that the walls had ears. The lies of the state were often obvious, and often discussed with very close friends and close family, and anything that wasn't an obvious lie was thus considered a likely lie anyway.
- TeMPOraL 6y agoThe trick is to avoid trusting parties that have incentives to abuse that trust and means to do so. Free market working the way it does, sooner or later one of such entities will abuse that trust. So, baked beans are probably OK in terms of SIGINT. Depending on how well food regulations are enforced in your area, I might or might not worry about the edibility of them, though. But on-line services are definitely suspect with respect to data handling. Doubly so, if they pop up where they shouldn't be in the first place - like e.g. IoT - as that's already evidence of a business model built on abusive relationship.
- lucb1e 6y ago> Doubly so, if they pop up where they shouldn't be in the first place - like e.g. IoT Hanlon's razor, "never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity", does seem to apply to that particular one, though. But I'm no war historian or politician or something; while the security of these devices is stupidity to the point of criminal negligence, I find it hard to say for sure whether some of this might be on purpose.
- nmlnn 6y agoThat's just something people repeat over and over again until it seems true. In reality it just provides cover for malicious actors/actions.
- bilbo0s 6y agoI agree. The CIA, NSA, DHS, etc are all much, much smarter than me, and I would use IoT to compromise targets if it were my job. So there's that data point.
- TeMPOraL 6y agoI have my own razor[0], that I tend to call Hanlon's Handgun: "Never attribute to stupidity that which can be adequately explained by systemic incentives promoting malice". I think it applies here more than Hanlon's Original. Also, I wasn't thinking about security. I was thinking about intentional abuse of data, that starts with collecting and processing data that doesn't need to be done for a device to function. -- [0] - Introduced in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21691282 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21691282, named after me in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21691718 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21691718 :).
- markdown 6y agoWatties FTW!
- vaccinator 6y agoThey'll probably figure out a non-suspicious way to include a computer in a can of bean soon enough... maybe it will let you know if the beans are still edible... in exchange, it will record everything you say.
- CamperBob2 6y agoComing soon: Juicero for Beans!
- fsflover 6y ago> what about the chips in your system? https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/precursor https://www.crowdsupply.com/sutajio-kosagi/precursor
- mhh__ 6y agoRISC-V is just a specification, you could quite happily sneak stuff into the RTL if you beat the right hands with a pipe.
- fsflover 6y agoPrecursor’s mainboard was designed for easy inspection as well, and even its LCD and keyboard were chosen specifically because they facilitate verification of proper construction with minimal equipment
- mhh__ 6y agoYou still have to trust both the verification procedure and the specification i.e. Given how a modern CPU has to have features to manage itself, it's relatively trivial to design a system to do what VW did and recognize when the device is under test. For example, if you've seen Christopher Domas's talk/s on finding undocumented features of CPUs, any backdoors in a modern CPU will be buried deep in the vendor-specific features or require an extremely esoteric combination of register values and the like.
- bobthebuilders 6y agoThe CPU architecture is open source for one, and the boards are designed in such a way as to make outside verification easier. Excited to get my hands on one!
- mhh__ 6y agoThe architecture isn't the chip itself.
- 6y ago
- unixhero 6y agoWell I often use G5 PowerPC
- matheusmoreira 6y ago> what about the chips in your system? We need a way to manufacture our own hardware. Just like we can already write our own software. Currently manufacturing processors costs billions of dollars. Consequently, the power to create computers is centralized in very few hands. They are easy targets for government regulation and compromise. What if we had technology that would let individual users fabricate their own hardware cheaply? That would give the power to create computers to everyone. We would then be able to create chips we could trust. Nobody would be able to interfere.
- nine_k 6y agoThere are hundreds if facilities which can produce computer chips, all over the world. The chips would be "old tech", though, e.g. 70 nm or even 120 nm.
- drivebycomment 6y agoJust as it's impossible to build skyscrapers or bridges or ships or cars or pretty much any modern sophisticated structures or machines without specialized equipments and skilled people and organizations - mostly companies, you can't build chips without companies. Modern semiconductor fab are a marvel. It takes amazing concentration of equipments and specialized folks to get a fab working. This "trust no one" is complete BS. A modern human society can not function without some trust.
- deeringc 6y agoAnd even if you fabricate your own hardware, you're still trusting the open source designs you download from the internet. Being able to audit them is much better than not being able to see them, but it's still very possible to have some incredibly subtle backdoor or vulnerability hiding in plain sight. This happens all the the time in complex systems. There is zero chance that you can design a functioning and useful chip and OS, from scratch without trusting something else along the way. That goes all the way to compilers, toolchains etc... And even if you could, chances are you've created hundreds of accidental security vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Zero trust is a fantasy.
- deleted 6y ago