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> As much as I like E2EE, I don't see where the problem lies? It's a step along a continuum where the end-to-end encrypted messenger wasn't uploading plaintext
by sneak 6y ago
> As much as I like E2EE, I don't see where the problem lies?
It's a step along a continuum where the end-to-end encrypted messenger wasn't uploading plaintext before, and now it is.
Apple's similar previously end-to-end encrypted iMessage went through a similar evolution: now iOS uploads the complete iMessage plaintext history to Apple (with Apple keys) via iCloud Backup.
We now know that Facebook deems it okay to exfiltrate plaintext, post-decryption, from the device in certain circumstances. This means we need to be cognizant and vigilant around the precise nature and boundaries of those circumstances, because "plaintext doesn't leave the device and get transmitted to Facebook" is no longer true.
A tap or two by one of the people you're talking to could upload your decrypted plaintext directly to the person-in-the-middle; this is a relatively significant footgun that we should remain aware of.
- est31 6y agoFacebook should definitely make it explicit that by reporting, you share the last N messages with that account with Facebook and make them accessible to Facebook employees/contractors. Regarding the iMessage backup thing, I fully agree with you that it's a major problem. But it's a different thing. Also, again, the feature already exists. You can already make screenshots and share them with facebook, with the world, etc. There are entire subreddits that publicly share IM histories with people. This is nothing that facebook can initiate. If the feature gets changed to something that they can initiate, I would agree that it's bad. But this isn't.
- sneak 6y ago> Regarding the iMessage backup thing, I fully agree with you that it's a major problem. But it's a different thing. It's certainly a different product thing, yes. But from an Alice-Mallory-Bob end-to-end encryption block diagram it's the exact same thing: Bob's device is sending Alice's plaintext, post-decryption, to Mallory (using Mallory's TLS keys). > If the feature gets changed to something that they can initiate, I would agree that it's bad. But this isn't. Considering that many (most?) users have app auto-update turned on, it's not entirely certain that Facebook can't initiate it.
- fossuser 6y agoIs the iCloud bit true? I've read HN comments about it, but when I've tried to understand it by searching around it looks like it is encrypted end-to-end and in iCloud backup (as long as you're not in China). https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209110#:~:text=We%20designed%20iMessage%20and%20FaceTime,(s)%20can%20access%20them https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT209110#:~:text=We%20design.... https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 Is there some subtlety I'm missing? That said, on this particular issue I think FB is striking a pretty good middle ground. Keeping things encrypted end-to-end for users, but allowing users to voluntarily report decrypted messages from their end is a good way to combat child abuse imagery and other illegal content without giving FB or governments back door key access. I have a friend on the data science team at whatsapp and his team is responsible for combatting child abuse imagery groups on whatsapp - it's a huge problem. A related comment I wrote when this came up previously: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23553997 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=23553997
- sneak 6y agoHT202303 has a list of things that are end-to-end encrypted. iCloud Backup is not in that list. Furthermore, it says: > Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices. When you turn off iCloud Backup, a new key is generated on your device to protect future messages and isn't stored by Apple. Note that all of the following are entirely different services: - iMessage (nominally e2e) - Messages in iCloud (e2e, but with the key stored in iCloud Backup if enabled) - this is a way of synchronizing iMessages across all of your devices (independent of backups) - iCloud Backup (not e2e) iCloud Backup is backing up either iMessage plaintext (if Messages in iCloud is off) or iMessage decryption keys (if Messages in iCloud is on), to Apple keys. In private conversations with Apple employees, I understood that this was to be fixed, but then the fix was never released. Then I read this: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... You can test this state of affairs trivially: 1. Get an iPhone, turn on iCloud Backup and iMessage. 2. Send and receive some iMessages, and do a backup. 3. Throw the iPhone into the river. 4. Call Apple, and claim you forgot your Apple ID password, and need to reset it. They will verify your identity using other information, and reset your Apple ID password. 5. Get a new iPhone. Log in with your reset Apple ID password, and restore from backup. 6. See message plaintext, decrypted with no key from you, your password, or your now-riverbed-domiciled old phone. Apple can decrypt full iCloud Backups without the user's password, or the user's device. These backups contain message history, message attachments, and iMessage decryption keys (which can be used to decrypt iMessage ciphertext which has already transited Apple's iMessage service). Apple is very careful not to ever explicitly lie, but to also say things in such a way that leads people to believe things (that benefit Apple) that aren't strictly true. HT202303 is a very good example of that style. If you don't have a detailed understanding of the different services ("iMessage", "Messages in iCloud", "iCloud Backup", et c) then you will likely misunderstand the statements.