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IPFS gateways are similar to Tor exit relays, they just route the traffic to the public internet. Tor exit relays still exist, and haven't been DCMAed out of ex

IPFS gateways are similar to Tor exit relays, they just route the traffic to the public internet. Tor exit relays still exist, and haven't been DCMAed out of existence so far. One could also imagine IPFS over Tor.

georgyo 6y ago
You're almost right. The IPFS gateway nodes also cache the content. IE, they are both storing, hosting, and sharing to other IPFS nodes.
- mpfundstein 6y ago
  how can one validate that the cached version is indeed bit equal to the one stored within ipfs?
  - openfuture 6y ago
    You hash it, everything is content addressed.
  - georgyo 6y ago
    The address of the file is the hash of the file. (Really the hash of the DAG of the file) So you could validate it if you wanted to. Because the URL _is_ the hash, if you did validate it you could be very sure that it is correct. If a webserver hosts a file, how can you be sure that file is correct? Sometimes the ship a sums file next to it. At best this can find corruption, but it would not find malicious files.
mintplant 6y ago
IPFS-over-Tor has been trapped in development hell for 5 years. https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37 https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37
- segfaultbuserr 6y ago
  If IPFS-over-Tor is in the development hell, IPFS-over-I2P is in the development limbo. https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/124 https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/124
segfaultbuserr 6y ago
Tor exit nodes are forward proxies, they are used by the client-side to initiate connections to the public Internet but do not accept connections from the public Internet. You cannot host an Internet-facing webserver on a Tor exit (Onion Service exists solely within the Tor network), DMCA is not an issue, they do not act as a point of content distribution, there is nothing to take down. The main issue is the abusive outgoing traffic, which is seen as unavoidable and outweighed by Tor's greater benefits, so the existence of Tor exits is justified. IPFS gateways (and Tor-to-Web) are reverse proxies, they are configured at the server-side to accept connections from the public Internet and route traffic to IPFS (and Tor), and they distribute content to the public Web. As far as I can see, this is a problem, someone can send DMCA notices, asking the gateway operators to take files down from the Web. The only protection I see is DMCA Section 512 (a.k.a Safe Harbor Provision), the operators are not liable for things solely hosted on IPFS, which is good, but gateways must comply with the takedown notices. So I think it's entirely possible for Cloudflare to put a huge blocklist on its IPFS gateway, and for smaller gateways that don't have the necessary resources to handle the requests, be DMCAed out of existence entirely. In the 2000s, RIAA launched campaigns against eD2k servers and BT trackers, including the use of honeypot servers to collect information. RIAA was not ultimately successful, but it created a major short-term disruption (eventually new servers would always appear in a different jurisdiction). A similar campaign against IPFS gateways sound possible if the publishers decided to launch an aggressive crackdown like the RIAA. The question is only a matter of whether the decision is made. I'm not saying that IPFS requires the use of IPFS gateways, they don't, and in a sense, gateways are counterproductive for the decentralization goal. But they do currently provide an useful service for the Web, and I'm just speculating whether a major disruption is possible.
- tutfbhuf 6y ago
  Thx segfaultbuserr for the detailed answer. I was wrong and I agree with you that IPFS gateways and Tor exits are two different things. Well, then we might need something like IPFS-over-Tor, using Tors anonymity features to make it more safe for operators.

georgyo 6y ago

You're almost right. The IPFS gateway nodes also cache the content. IE, they are both storing, hosting, and sharing to other IPFS nodes.

mpfundstein 6y ago
how can one validate that the cached version is indeed bit equal to the one stored within ipfs?
- openfuture 6y ago
  You hash it, everything is content addressed.
- georgyo 6y ago
  The address of the file is the hash of the file. (Really the hash of the DAG of the file) So you could validate it if you wanted to. Because the URL _is_ the hash, if you did validate it you could be very sure that it is correct. If a webserver hosts a file, how can you be sure that file is correct? Sometimes the ship a sums file next to it. At best this can find corruption, but it would not find malicious files.

mintplant 6y ago

IPFS-over-Tor has been trapped in development hell for 5 years. https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37 https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/37

segfaultbuserr 6y ago
If IPFS-over-Tor is in the development hell, IPFS-over-I2P is in the development limbo. https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/124 https://github.com/ipfs/notes/issues/124

segfaultbuserr 6y ago

Tor exit nodes are forward proxies, they are used by the client-side to initiate connections to the public Internet but do not accept connections from the public Internet. You cannot host an Internet-facing webserver on a Tor exit (Onion Service exists solely within the Tor network), DMCA is not an issue, they do not act as a point of content distribution, there is nothing to take down. The main issue is the abusive outgoing traffic, which is seen as unavoidable and outweighed by Tor's greater benefits, so the existence of Tor exits is justified. IPFS gateways (and Tor-to-Web) are reverse proxies, they are configured at the server-side to accept connections from the public Internet and route traffic to IPFS (and Tor), and they distribute content to the public Web. As far as I can see, this is a problem, someone can send DMCA notices, asking the gateway operators to take files down from the Web. The only protection I see is DMCA Section 512 (a.k.a Safe Harbor Provision), the operators are not liable for things solely hosted on IPFS, which is good, but gateways must comply with the takedown notices. So I think it's entirely possible for Cloudflare to put a huge blocklist on its IPFS gateway, and for smaller gateways that don't have the necessary resources to handle the requests, be DMCAed out of existence entirely. In the 2000s, RIAA launched campaigns against eD2k servers and BT trackers, including the use of honeypot servers to collect information. RIAA was not ultimately successful, but it created a major short-term disruption (eventually new servers would always appear in a different jurisdiction). A similar campaign against IPFS gateways sound possible if the publishers decided to launch an aggressive crackdown like the RIAA. The question is only a matter of whether the decision is made. I'm not saying that IPFS requires the use of IPFS gateways, they don't, and in a sense, gateways are counterproductive for the decentralization goal. But they do currently provide an useful service for the Web, and I'm just speculating whether a major disruption is possible.

tutfbhuf 6y ago
Thx segfaultbuserr for the detailed answer. I was wrong and I agree with you that IPFS gateways and Tor exits are two different things. Well, then we might need something like IPFS-over-Tor, using Tors anonymity features to make it more safe for operators.