2 ms·
I can imagine this... two extremely thin foils separated by an insulating layer, one connected to a supercap charged at 100V at every time the stick is plugged
by mschuster91 6y ago
I can imagine this... two extremely thin foils separated by an insulating layer, one connected to a supercap charged at 100V at every time the stick is plugged in, the other layer connected to all pins of the flash memory via diodes. Then, encase the whole thing in epoxy. When someone attempts to cut it open now, the short between the foils will discharge the supercap to fry the memory.
- dathinab 6y agoSounds plausible especially given that most likely frying the view bytes containing the AES key is enough. (Most systems have a stored AES key which then again is encrypted e.g. with a password).
- Someone 6y agoYou can also wrap it in something that reacts vehemently with oxygen and wrap that in a thin foil. That may last longer than that capacitor and, I guess, is less easily defeated (does that charge fry the stored bits or only the logic for reading and writing it? How do you defend against Evie carefully drilling into the epoxy until contact with the charge is made?) A step up is two chemicals that don’t need oxygen (prevents Evie from opening the device in a nitrogen atmosphere). Bonus points if they only explode when depressurized, as then, you can mix them inside the device. I think techniques like those have been used in safes, but can’t find a link. I did find https://people.kth.se/~msmith/is2500_pdf/Anti-Tamper%20Techniques_elena.pdf https://people.kth.se/~msmith/is2500_pdf/Anti-Tamper%20Techn..., which discusses this use case. It mentions detecting attempts to X-ray the device, and even mentions using explosives (with a remark “this option is not practical for consumer electronics”). I guess that is not a problem in military hardware (if a F-35 falls into enemy hands, destroying its software probably is more important than destroying the plane)
- TecoAndJix 6y agoThanks for sharing that deck! The section on volatile memory retention time/temperature stood out to me: for SRAM, at room temperature the data retention time varies from 0.1 to 10 sec – cooling SRAM to -20oC increases the retention time to 1 sec to 17 min – at -50oC the retention time is 10 sec to 10 hours