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This little chunk seems questionable: 'Hart befriended many of the surviving German generals — often by visiting them in their prison cells — and bolstered his

by dash2 6y ago

This little chunk seems questionable: 'Hart befriended many of the surviving German generals — often by visiting them in their prison cells — and bolstered his case via a tacit quid pro quo that would have gone something like this if anyone had dared to speak it aloud: “Say that you developed Blitzkrieg warfare by reading my old texts, and I’ll use my influence to promote the position that you were only a soldier following orders and don’t deserve to die in prison.”' If it was tacit, how do we know it happened?

mcguire 6y ago
IIRC, little things like German generals, in their autobiographies, saying things like "if the Brits and French had listened to Liddell Hart, they wouldn't have lost to us in 1940" or "our tactics were based on reading Liddell Hart's early infantry tactics work" when there is little to no chance that they could have known who he was at the time and most of his writings prior to WWII were based on the ide that "blitzkrieg" was impossible. In turn, he wrote several books along the lines of the "clean Wehrmacht" and that German generals were brilliant---specifically, most of the German generals you've ever heard of. See *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History" by John J. Mearsheimer.
- dash2 6y ago
  That doesn't sound like evidence for the claim. It's like saying that Chevron was behind 9/11 because they gained from the consequences. Also, it seems weird to think the German generals wouldn't have heard of Liddell Hart - he was a major historian of WWI. Indeed, this article provides evidence that Rommel, for one, had heard of him: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515920.pdf https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515920.pdf
  - mcguire 6y ago
    That's an interesting review! "One visitor was Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, a former General Staff officer on Rommel's staff in North Africa. Since Liddell Hart rarely if ever deviated from his established schedule, it was my responsibility to entertain the general for several hours, which provided the opportunity to inquire whether Rommel had in fact ever mentioned Liddell Hart in his presence. "Oh yes," he assured me, "many times. He had a good opinion of his writings. That is why I have come from South Africa to meet him." This of course does not make Rommel a pupil, except perhaps in the eyes-and books-'--Of Liddell Hart. But Rommel was familiar with his theories, and there is no doubt that other serious military readers found many of his ideas worth thinking about." I'll stand corrected! (Although the little cynic that lives inside me wants to point out that this conversation seems to have occurred well into the cold war. And then, there's "If I was being "used" I was not aware of it, although when he read proofs to a book I was about to publish he did insist that I insert the word "deep" before "strategic penetration" in a part characterizing some past writings of his own. I could not understand why the point seemed so important, and when I retorted that this was not the way it was worded in his analysis of the Mongol campaigns, he replied that it should have been obvious from the context that it was what he had meant. I conceded the point, but wondered at the time why he was being such a stickler about it." which is essentially the behavior Meersheimer is describing.) On the other hand, this quote makes it seem like a character trait rather than a devious plot: "One day I found in his files a copy of one of General Douglas MacArthur's reports to the Secretary of War when he was Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. Liddell Hart had underlined numerous passages and marked in the margins which of his own works a specific idea or phrase had come from. It was an old file, so this had nothing to do with rebuilding a "badly stained reputation." To Liddell Hart these passages signified that MacArthur, who later demonstrated brilliant applications of the indirect approach in New Guinea and the Philippines, was familiar with his books." Anyway, the history of Liddell Hart's thought as I understand it is, in the last year of WW1 and shortly after the war, he was involved in the development of the British version of what would be come to be called "stormtrooper tactics"; attacking at a single point to create a breach in the front lines which could then be expanded. This period also included his collaboration with JFC Fuller (who was all "Tanks you very much!"). Then, through the 20s, he wrote about the "indirect approach", which may or may not have been a conceptual predecessor or possibly even influential on "blitzkrieg" (which wasn't a solid doctrine or plan to the Germans in 1939-40). However, through the 30s he became convinced that, tactically and operationally, the defense was much stronger than the offense (which was largely the guiding wisdom in Britain and France in the late 30s and early 1940. As a result, his indirect approach became more and more indirect until he became a strong proponent of "the British way of war": maintaining a strong blockade and giving the French money, not soldiers. By the late 30s, he was strongly against putting British soldiers in continental Europe and is on record as supporting appeasement to at least some extent. As a result, in the 40s his name was mud, at least in military circles, and his interactions with German generals and the white-washing of the Wehrmacht was very important to the recovery of his reputation, whether that was a grand scheme or no. In any case, here's another detailed take on Liddell Hart and the German generals, from the standpoint of his and their participation in German rearmament for the cold war. "A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953" by Alaric Searle. http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/1/War_In_History-1998-Searle-327-57.pdf http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/1/War_In_History-1... "Bywayofconclusion, ifoneseekstoputtheveryspecialrelationshipwhichexistedbetweenLiddellHartandWehrmachtgeneralsintotheoverallcontextoftheformer'scareer, anumberofobservationscanbemade. Firstofall, undoubtedlyLiddellHartbenefitedgreatlyasawriterfromhiscontactswiththegenerals; ontheonehandasasourceofinformationforhishistoricalwritingandontheotherforsupportintheeffortshewasmakingtoadvertisethe'influence'ofhistheoriesinGermanyintheinterwarperiod. However, thecentralmotivatingforceinthealliancebetweenLiddellHartandthemostprominentGermangeneralswasnothistoricalresearch, butrathertheexigenciesofthecampaignforrearmament; arehabilitationofthetopgeneralswasseenasacrucialcomponentofthepublicrelationscampaignwhichhadtobewaged." [Yeah, cut-n-paste from PDF is probelmatic.]

by dash2 6y ago

mcguire 6y ago

IIRC, little things like German generals, in their autobiographies, saying things like "if the Brits and French had listened to Liddell Hart, they wouldn't have lost to us in 1940" or "our tactics were based on reading Liddell Hart's early infantry tactics work" when there is little to no chance that they could have known who he was at the time and most of his writings prior to WWII were based on the ide that "blitzkrieg" was impossible. In turn, he wrote several books along the lines of the "clean Wehrmacht" and that German generals were brilliant---specifically, most of the German generals you've ever heard of. See *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History" by John J. Mearsheimer.

dash2 6y ago
That doesn't sound like evidence for the claim. It's like saying that Chevron was behind 9/11 because they gained from the consequences. Also, it seems weird to think the German generals wouldn't have heard of Liddell Hart - he was a major historian of WWI. Indeed, this article provides evidence that Rommel, for one, had heard of him: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515920.pdf https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515920.pdf
- mcguire 6y ago
  That's an interesting review! "One visitor was Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, a former General Staff officer on Rommel's staff in North Africa. Since Liddell Hart rarely if ever deviated from his established schedule, it was my responsibility to entertain the general for several hours, which provided the opportunity to inquire whether Rommel had in fact ever mentioned Liddell Hart in his presence. "Oh yes," he assured me, "many times. He had a good opinion of his writings. That is why I have come from South Africa to meet him." This of course does not make Rommel a pupil, except perhaps in the eyes-and books-'--Of Liddell Hart. But Rommel was familiar with his theories, and there is no doubt that other serious military readers found many of his ideas worth thinking about." I'll stand corrected! (Although the little cynic that lives inside me wants to point out that this conversation seems to have occurred well into the cold war. And then, there's "If I was being "used" I was not aware of it, although when he read proofs to a book I was about to publish he did insist that I insert the word "deep" before "strategic penetration" in a part characterizing some past writings of his own. I could not understand why the point seemed so important, and when I retorted that this was not the way it was worded in his analysis of the Mongol campaigns, he replied that it should have been obvious from the context that it was what he had meant. I conceded the point, but wondered at the time why he was being such a stickler about it." which is essentially the behavior Meersheimer is describing.) On the other hand, this quote makes it seem like a character trait rather than a devious plot: "One day I found in his files a copy of one of General Douglas MacArthur's reports to the Secretary of War when he was Chief of Staff in the early 1930s. Liddell Hart had underlined numerous passages and marked in the margins which of his own works a specific idea or phrase had come from. It was an old file, so this had nothing to do with rebuilding a "badly stained reputation." To Liddell Hart these passages signified that MacArthur, who later demonstrated brilliant applications of the indirect approach in New Guinea and the Philippines, was familiar with his books." Anyway, the history of Liddell Hart's thought as I understand it is, in the last year of WW1 and shortly after the war, he was involved in the development of the British version of what would be come to be called "stormtrooper tactics"; attacking at a single point to create a breach in the front lines which could then be expanded. This period also included his collaboration with JFC Fuller (who was all "Tanks you very much!"). Then, through the 20s, he wrote about the "indirect approach", which may or may not have been a conceptual predecessor or possibly even influential on "blitzkrieg" (which wasn't a solid doctrine or plan to the Germans in 1939-40). However, through the 30s he became convinced that, tactically and operationally, the defense was much stronger than the offense (which was largely the guiding wisdom in Britain and France in the late 30s and early 1940. As a result, his indirect approach became more and more indirect until he became a strong proponent of "the British way of war": maintaining a strong blockade and giving the French money, not soldiers. By the late 30s, he was strongly against putting British soldiers in continental Europe and is on record as supporting appeasement to at least some extent. As a result, in the 40s his name was mud, at least in military circles, and his interactions with German generals and the white-washing of the Wehrmacht was very important to the recovery of his reputation, whether that was a grand scheme or no. In any case, here's another detailed take on Liddell Hart and the German generals, from the standpoint of his and their participation in German rearmament for the cold war. "A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953" by Alaric Searle. http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/1/War_In_History-1998-Searle-327-57.pdf http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/30779/1/War_In_History-1... "Bywayofconclusion, ifoneseekstoputtheveryspecialrelationshipwhichexistedbetweenLiddellHartandWehrmachtgeneralsintotheoverallcontextoftheformer'scareer, anumberofobservationscanbemade. Firstofall, undoubtedlyLiddellHartbenefitedgreatlyasawriterfromhiscontactswiththegenerals; ontheonehandasasourceofinformationforhishistoricalwritingandontheotherforsupportintheeffortshewasmakingtoadvertisethe'influence'ofhistheoriesinGermanyintheinterwarperiod. However, thecentralmotivatingforceinthealliancebetweenLiddellHartandthemostprominentGermangeneralswasnothistoricalresearch, butrathertheexigenciesofthecampaignforrearmament; arehabilitationofthetopgeneralswasseenasacrucialcomponentofthepublicrelationscampaignwhichhadtobewaged." [Yeah, cut-n-paste from PDF is probelmatic.]