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It's worth noting that Toyota ended up paying $1.2 billion for concealing details and making deceptive statements about the 2009-2011 'unintended acceleration'

It's worth noting that Toyota ended up paying $1.2 billion for concealing details and making deceptive statements about the 2009-2011 'unintended acceleration' issue that killed 5 people. https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/toyota-pay-12b-hiding-deadly-unintended-acceleration/story?id=22972214 https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/toyota-pay-12b-hiding-deadly-...

MobileVet 6y ago
TIL. All I ever remember hearing about was that it was determined that the vehicles were NOT at fault and Toyota was exonerated. Sad that the follow on investigations wasn't as widely reported on, or at least I missed them. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_unintended_acceleration https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_unintended_acceleration
specialist 6y ago
Reading a post mortem of this unintended acceleration is on my to do list. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009–11_Toyota_vehicle_recalls https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009–11_Toyota_vehicle_recalls Something like Richard Feynman's uncovering of NASA's Space Shuttle O-ring problem (which led to the Challenger disaster), Donald Norman's recap of the Three Mile Island disaster, and the examples detailed in the book Why Most Things Fail. Know of any insider accounts? My noob hunch (gleaned from popular reporting) is that Toyota outsourced this system, lacked institutional expertise to detect and prevent these kinds of failures. This outsourcing surprised me. Toyota was known for keeping some fraction of all work in-house, like battery production, explicitly to prevent this kind of organizational dysfunction. I'd like to know why these systems were handled differently. And what org changes they've made since. Per Sandy Munro and the Autoline pundits, Tesla develops all of they own systems in-house. While I'm aware of their struggles, long term I think this is the better strategy. Thoughts?

MobileVet 6y ago

TIL. All I ever remember hearing about was that it was determined that the vehicles were NOT at fault and Toyota was exonerated. Sad that the follow on investigations wasn't as widely reported on, or at least I missed them. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_unintended_acceleration https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudden_unintended_acceleration

specialist 6y ago

Reading a post mortem of this unintended acceleration is on my to do list. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009–11_Toyota_vehicle_recalls https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009–11_Toyota_vehicle_recalls Something like Richard Feynman's uncovering of NASA's Space Shuttle O-ring problem (which led to the Challenger disaster), Donald Norman's recap of the Three Mile Island disaster, and the examples detailed in the book Why Most Things Fail. Know of any insider accounts? My noob hunch (gleaned from popular reporting) is that Toyota outsourced this system, lacked institutional expertise to detect and prevent these kinds of failures. This outsourcing surprised me. Toyota was known for keeping some fraction of all work in-house, like battery production, explicitly to prevent this kind of organizational dysfunction. I'd like to know why these systems were handled differently. And what org changes they've made since. Per Sandy Munro and the Autoline pundits, Tesla develops all of they own systems in-house. While I'm aware of their struggles, long term I think this is the better strategy. Thoughts?