3 ms·
No, different testing strategy. See https://github.com/rurban/dieharder/issues/6 https://github.com/rurban/dieharder/issues/6 You could remove outliers which o
by rurban 6y ago
No, different testing strategy.
See https://github.com/rurban/dieharder/issues/6 https://github.com/rurban/dieharder/issues/6
You could remove outliers which occur statistically with a certain chance, cry out at the first encounter, or check weak results again with different seeds to resolve potential ambiguities in bad p-values.
With my fixes dieharder finds the same flaws as PractRand and TestU01, just faster. PractRand is still better though.
The cited crypto generators are not statistically better, as they fail much more tests then expected. They are just more secure. More secure does not mean that it is better per se.
- CodesInChaos 6y agoThe security definition for RNGs is indistinguishably from truly random data. So if there is any test that they fail more often (averaged over random seeds) than true randomness, they're broken. So you're claiming that dumb statistical tests broke three completely different CSPRNGs? That's a rather extraordinary claim, which I have a hard time believing.
- saithound 6y agoThere is no such thing as "not statistically better, just more secure" [1]. If an AES DRBG systematically fails your statistical test, then something is wrong. Probably your DRBG implemetation, or your test. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_attack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distinguishing_attack