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> “Add-ons and browsers that randomize the results of fingerprinting metrics have the potential to confuse trackers and mitigate the effects of fingerprinting a

> “Add-ons and browsers that randomize the results of fingerprinting metrics have the potential to confuse trackers and mitigate the effects of fingerprinting as a method of tracking.” I would like to dispute this. It is easy to detect when a user is spoofing certain settings. As such, randomizing fingerprint data increases entropy, making your browser more unique, not less. There is a reason why the Tor browser works so hard to make sure every user has the same fingerprint, rather than randomizing it. More on that here: https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#small_orange_diamond-%EF%B8%8F-anti-fingerprinting-extensions-fk-no https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js/wiki/4.1-Extensions#smal...

ACow_Adonis 6y ago
The key here is randomising them over time. If you browse website A and website B, with different randomised qualities at different times, and your non-randomised data isn't enough to sufficiently identify you, then although A and B might be able to identify that you're spoofing certain settings, they can't identify that you're the same entity browsing both websites. If you just set things to a weird or unlikely value, then you're as identifiable as a man who walks down the street in a mascot uniform that he never takes off. That is to say, although they don't know the 'person' behind the mask, all you need to look for is the dingus wearing the capital city goofball costume. Indeed, it makes you stand out more...
- jobigoud 6y ago
  If not a lot of people do it the bit of information "this browser is spoofing certain settings" is also a very telling thing and combined with the non-randomized data may tip the balance towards uniqueness.
renewiltord 6y ago
But uniqueness is valuable only if you have identity. If you can't tell that dude A is also dude B then you just have a million dudes and you can't violate anyone's privacy.
minitech 6y ago
”Random data” can be part of that “same fingerprint”, and it actually already is (Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting, and I think Tor too, randomize canvas and WebGL results).

ACow_Adonis 6y ago

The key here is randomising them over time. If you browse website A and website B, with different randomised qualities at different times, and your non-randomised data isn't enough to sufficiently identify you, then although A and B might be able to identify that you're spoofing certain settings, they can't identify that you're the same entity browsing both websites. If you just set things to a weird or unlikely value, then you're as identifiable as a man who walks down the street in a mascot uniform that he never takes off. That is to say, although they don't know the 'person' behind the mask, all you need to look for is the dingus wearing the capital city goofball costume. Indeed, it makes you stand out more...

jobigoud 6y ago
If not a lot of people do it the bit of information "this browser is spoofing certain settings" is also a very telling thing and combined with the non-randomized data may tip the balance towards uniqueness.

renewiltord 6y ago

But uniqueness is valuable only if you have identity. If you can't tell that dude A is also dude B then you just have a million dudes and you can't violate anyone's privacy.

minitech 6y ago

”Random data” can be part of that “same fingerprint”, and it actually already is (Firefox with privacy.resistFingerprinting, and I think Tor too, randomize canvas and WebGL results).