> You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli [...] you're also confused about the timing of the

> You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli [...] you're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo. Where did I mention anything about the oil embargo? You're the one who brought that up, and now you're arguing with yourself. The historians who are of the opinion that the Hull note amounts to a declaration of war aren't talking about the aspect of it that relates to oil. Nobody thinks a refusal to trade goods amounts to a declaration of war, rather the part where the US implicitly threatens "or else" if Japan doesn't sign on to some version of a wide ranging policy agreement it didn't find palatable. > Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family. It sounds like you're in agreement with my point then. This whole thread is about the supposed irrationality of Japanese admirals subservient to Yamamoto. Not about what Yamamoto could have done. I invite you to re-read fatbird's upthreads comment while you're looking for some place where I directly or indirectly mentioned anything about oil (I didn't), I.e.: > "The Japanese generals and admirals agreed to the attack on Pearl Harbour despite the admiral leading it[...]"