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This article focus a lot on the technical and operational aspects of DNS and DoH, and only a single sentence about Trusted Recursive Resolver and a link. The t

by belorn 6y ago

This article focus a lot on the technical and operational aspects of DNS and DoH, and only a single sentence about Trusted Recursive Resolver and a link. The trust model in this change for improved security do not sit in the technical and operational aspects of DNS and DoH (assuming we trust the math involved in encryption that we already use for things like https). What the model depend on is the Trusted Recursive Resolver, and if we find those third-party to be more trusted than other alternatives. Mozilla is however not doing much work to convince and explain why that program should be trusted. Who verify that the logs and commitments are followed through? What is the consequences if someone fails? How can the individual user who is giving away their private data exercise control and agency? In the linked document the only answer that I can find is this: The decision of who to include in (or remove from) Mozilla’s Trusted Recursive Resolver (TRR) program is at Mozilla’s sole discretion. I personally do not think that is enough for me in regard to my own data. Where I live (EU) I at least got GDPR to use if my ISP decide to go rouge with my data. I also got a contract with the ISP. In additional my country have a few different government agencies that in theory could jump in. Neither of those would be an option if the data is shipped over seas.

tristor 6y ago
>Who verify that the logs and commitments are followed through? https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DOH-resolver-policy https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DOH-resolver-policy Mozilla publicly lists the policies which TRRs contractually agree to. In addition to the above, the contracts (some of which have become public) also contain third-party audit requirements. > What is the consequences if someone fails? They lose their TRR status, presumably. > How can the individual user who is giving away their private data exercise control and agency? DoH is surfaced in Firefox, you can choose not to enable it, or you can choose to configure it to explicitly use any DoH endpoint your choose. On my network I use a Pi-Hole which talks to DoH on the backend and everything on my network is forced through the PiHole and all other DNS/DoH is blocked. You can use similar mechanisms, and Firefox surfaces preferences for DoH. Just like any other decision, a sensible default which serves users needs to be made, and advanced users can configure things. Firefox chooses the sensible default of using encrypted DNS to trusted resolvers for users, and if you want to do otherwise, you are free to do so. Nothing removes your agency as a user. > I personally do not think that is enough for me in regard to my own data. Where I live (EU) I at least got GDPR to use if my ISP decide to go rouge with my data. I also got a contract with the ISP. In additional my country have a few different government agencies that in theory could jump in. Neither of those would be an option if the data is shipped over seas. Nothing in the current implementation ships data outside your jurisdiction. DoH is only enabled in the US pointed at a US-based provider (CloudFlare). There are numerous providers in the EU that may sign up to the TRR program as Mozilla gets to the point of rolling out DoH in Europe. This comment period gives them an opportunity to get feedback prior to getting to that point. I think perhaps you should send them your feedback directly.
- belorn 6y ago
  A lot of this could be resolved by a simple legal document given on first use when connected to the Trusted Recursive Resolver. Cloudflare could give the user a contract that obligates itself to follow the rules under the TRR program, with fines similar to GDPR if it ever broke them. That way the user could exercise control and agency under contract law, and the cost of breaking the obligations would be financially in addition to loosing TRR status. It would also not make the situation worse compared to keeping the default in EU to be the users own ISP. At most the user would loose the protection given by national consumer agencies, which for me would be a loss but for the average in EU might be less so. Would CloudFlare agree to do so, or would they just drop out of TRR if such requirement were made?
  - tristor 6y ago
    That's an interesting concept. I'm sure there's lots of pieces to that. Perhaps you should email them that as part of your feedback to their comment period.

by belorn 6y ago

tristor 6y ago

>Who verify that the logs and commitments are followed through? https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DOH-resolver-policy https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/DOH-resolver-policy Mozilla publicly lists the policies which TRRs contractually agree to. In addition to the above, the contracts (some of which have become public) also contain third-party audit requirements. > What is the consequences if someone fails? They lose their TRR status, presumably. > How can the individual user who is giving away their private data exercise control and agency? DoH is surfaced in Firefox, you can choose not to enable it, or you can choose to configure it to explicitly use any DoH endpoint your choose. On my network I use a Pi-Hole which talks to DoH on the backend and everything on my network is forced through the PiHole and all other DNS/DoH is blocked. You can use similar mechanisms, and Firefox surfaces preferences for DoH. Just like any other decision, a sensible default which serves users needs to be made, and advanced users can configure things. Firefox chooses the sensible default of using encrypted DNS to trusted resolvers for users, and if you want to do otherwise, you are free to do so. Nothing removes your agency as a user. > I personally do not think that is enough for me in regard to my own data. Where I live (EU) I at least got GDPR to use if my ISP decide to go rouge with my data. I also got a contract with the ISP. In additional my country have a few different government agencies that in theory could jump in. Neither of those would be an option if the data is shipped over seas. Nothing in the current implementation ships data outside your jurisdiction. DoH is only enabled in the US pointed at a US-based provider (CloudFlare). There are numerous providers in the EU that may sign up to the TRR program as Mozilla gets to the point of rolling out DoH in Europe. This comment period gives them an opportunity to get feedback prior to getting to that point. I think perhaps you should send them your feedback directly.

belorn 6y ago
A lot of this could be resolved by a simple legal document given on first use when connected to the Trusted Recursive Resolver. Cloudflare could give the user a contract that obligates itself to follow the rules under the TRR program, with fines similar to GDPR if it ever broke them. That way the user could exercise control and agency under contract law, and the cost of breaking the obligations would be financially in addition to loosing TRR status. It would also not make the situation worse compared to keeping the default in EU to be the users own ISP. At most the user would loose the protection given by national consumer agencies, which for me would be a loss but for the average in EU might be less so. Would CloudFlare agree to do so, or would they just drop out of TRR if such requirement were made?
- tristor 6y ago
  That's an interesting concept. I'm sure there's lots of pieces to that. Perhaps you should email them that as part of your feedback to their comment period.