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> You seem to imply that these things just "happen" and that no one is in control or making decisions [...] Tojo and his warmongers sought out conflict in the r

by avar 6y ago

> You seem to imply that these things just "happen" and that no one is in control or making decisions [...] Tojo and his warmongers sought out conflict in the region, dismissed counsel from wiser heads, and set Japan on a course to ruin [...] Hirohito made a choice to continue to allow the militarist factions in the Japanese government to hold sway. Uh, no, I did not imply that in the least. I think you're just on some rant against a strawman view that the Empire of Japan wasn't militaristic or an aggressor nation in Manchuria or Pearl Harbor / WWII. I didn't suggest anything of the sort, I was merely replying to the narrow question of whether an admiral on Isoroku Yamamoto's staff could be considered irrational for going along with the Pearl Harbor attack. I don't think that's the case for exactly the reasons you seem to agree with and are arguing for. What options do you think an admiral who's not in a senior role has in the Empire of Japan at the time when, as you've noted, his boss's-boss's and boss's-boss's-boss's etc. are clearly in favor of that general strategy? The idea that the Hull note was perceived as a casus belli isn't some fringe conspiracy theory. If you e.g. read the Wikipedia articles involved such as [1] and [2] they cite scholars who agree (and others who disagree) with that view. 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_note#Interpretations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hull_note#Interpretations 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_on_Pearl_Harbor https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Events_leading_to_the_attack_o...

greedo 6y ago
You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli since the US <demanded unconditional withdrawal from China.> This is factually incorrect. The goal of the oil embargo was to get Japan out of Indochina, not China or Manchuria. Japan could have finessed this by installing a puppet regime (ala Manchuko), but their arrogance wouldn't allow that. Now you move from <a general deciding to attack Perl(sic) Harbor is making the best and most rational decision> to <an admiral who's not in a senior role has in the Empire of Japan> Yamato is the architect of both the tactical plan of attacking Pearl Harbor, as well as the strategy of reducing American seapower (by attacking PH) and then defeating them in a decisive battle (Midway). He's not some lower ranking officer, he's the intellectual and martial spirit of the IJN. This also shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the power and influence of Yamamoto. Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family. Yamamoto could have used this influence earlier, to moderate Tojo's ambitions, and to avoid conflict with the US. He knew that Japan could never defeat the US over time, but still acted irrationally in a way that failed Japan. You're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo, and the Hull note. The oil embargo (along with other trade restrictions and confiscation of Japanese assets) began immediately in July 41 after the Japanese began to make obvious preparations to attack either the British in Malaya, or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Hull note was a last ditch attempt in late November to forestall war. At this point, war was inevitable; the attack on Pearl Harbor had been planned since Spring of 41, and the Kido Butai had already departed before the Hull note was sent.
- avar 6y ago
  > You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli [...] you're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo. Where did I mention anything about the oil embargo? You're the one who brought that up, and now you're arguing with yourself. The historians who are of the opinion that the Hull note amounts to a declaration of war aren't talking about the aspect of it that relates to oil. Nobody thinks a refusal to trade goods amounts to a declaration of war, rather the part where the US implicitly threatens "or else" if Japan doesn't sign on to some version of a wide ranging policy agreement it didn't find palatable. > Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family. It sounds like you're in agreement with my point then. This whole thread is about the supposed irrationality of Japanese admirals subservient to Yamamoto. Not about what Yamamoto could have done. I invite you to re-read fatbird's upthreads comment while you're looking for some place where I directly or indirectly mentioned anything about oil (I didn't), I.e.: > "The Japanese generals and admirals agreed to the attack on Pearl Harbour despite the admiral leading it[...]"

by avar 6y ago

greedo 6y ago

You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli since the US <demanded unconditional withdrawal from China.> This is factually incorrect. The goal of the oil embargo was to get Japan out of Indochina, not China or Manchuria. Japan could have finessed this by installing a puppet regime (ala Manchuko), but their arrogance wouldn't allow that. Now you move from <a general deciding to attack Perl(sic) Harbor is making the best and most rational decision> to <an admiral who's not in a senior role has in the Empire of Japan> Yamato is the architect of both the tactical plan of attacking Pearl Harbor, as well as the strategy of reducing American seapower (by attacking PH) and then defeating them in a decisive battle (Midway). He's not some lower ranking officer, he's the intellectual and martial spirit of the IJN. This also shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the power and influence of Yamamoto. Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family. Yamamoto could have used this influence earlier, to moderate Tojo's ambitions, and to avoid conflict with the US. He knew that Japan could never defeat the US over time, but still acted irrationally in a way that failed Japan. You're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo, and the Hull note. The oil embargo (along with other trade restrictions and confiscation of Japanese assets) began immediately in July 41 after the Japanese began to make obvious preparations to attack either the British in Malaya, or the Dutch in the East Indies. The Hull note was a last ditch attempt in late November to forestall war. At this point, war was inevitable; the attack on Pearl Harbor had been planned since Spring of 41, and the Kido Butai had already departed before the Hull note was sent.

avar 6y ago
> You're simply changing the goalposts. First you start off with saying that the oil embargo was casus belli [...] you're also confused about the timing of the oil embargo. Where did I mention anything about the oil embargo? You're the one who brought that up, and now you're arguing with yourself. The historians who are of the opinion that the Hull note amounts to a declaration of war aren't talking about the aspect of it that relates to oil. Nobody thinks a refusal to trade goods amounts to a declaration of war, rather the part where the US implicitly threatens "or else" if Japan doesn't sign on to some version of a wide ranging policy agreement it didn't find palatable. > Yamamoto was the most powerful officer in the IJN, and also had tremendous influence with the Imperial Family. It sounds like you're in agreement with my point then. This whole thread is about the supposed irrationality of Japanese admirals subservient to Yamamoto. Not about what Yamamoto could have done. I invite you to re-read fatbird's upthreads comment while you're looking for some place where I directly or indirectly mentioned anything about oil (I didn't), I.e.: > "The Japanese generals and admirals agreed to the attack on Pearl Harbour despite the admiral leading it[...]"