5 ms·
> By Sabine's stance, the problem of induction [0] hasn't been "solved" The "problem" of induction is a different kind of problem from the black hole informati
by pdonis 6y ago
> By Sabine's stance, the problem of induction [0] hasn't been "solved"
The "problem" of induction is a different kind of problem from the black hole information loss problem.
Induction can't be tested against experimental data. Induction isn't a testable hypothesis; it's a strategy we have no choice but to adopt if we want to plan for the future at all. So there is no "problem" of induction at all: it's just something we're stuck with.
Proposed solutions to the black hole information loss problem can be tested against experimental data; we just don't have the technical capability to acquire such data yet. That doesn't change the fact that until proposed solutions are tested against experimental data, and some proposed solution passes the test, the black hole information loss problem is not solved.
- enkid 6y agoThe problem if induction attacks the idea of experiments leading to anything meaningful.
- whimsicalism 6y agoMy point is that there are always going to be equally possible alternative theories which make any problem "unsolvable". I could make a theory that says that gravity works exactly as we think it does, except in about 1000 years will cease to function entirely - and that theory would be equally consistent with observation. I would be equally correct in saying that we do not yet posses the technology (time travel) to falsify this theory. We have to rely on some sort of proxy for the simplicity or elegance of the theory in order to preclude hypotheses like the above. If we find an elegant solution to the BHIP that uses existing QM + GR (which are empirically verified), then that seems like a pretty good resolution even if it can't be observationally verified directly at a black hole yet.
- pdonis 6y ago> We have to rely on some sort of proxy for the simplicity or elegance of the theory in order to preclude hypotheses like the above. No, we don't. The rule that precludes your hypothesis is much simpler: the laws of physics don't change with time. That doesn't require the laws of physics to be "simple" or "elegant", and doesn't require anyone's subjective judgment about which laws of physics they think are more beautiful.
- whatshisface 6y ago>The rule that precludes your hypothesis is much simpler: the laws of physics don't change with time Why should we believe this rule?
- mannykannot 6y agoYou can believe what you like - science is not concerned with persuading every skeptic.
- whimsicalism 6y agoThe point isn't skepticism of science, it's the recognition that something akin to Occam's Razor has to be used in theory, as there will always be an infinite number of unfalsifiable theories for any set of observations. In this context, Sabine is the skeptic of theory writ large. So many replies taking my argument to be the exact opposite of what it is.
- mannykannot 6y agoMy post above was a specific response to whatshisface's comment, saying that science need not, and will not, be hobbled by inordinate skepicism (which, if persued consistently, collapses into useless solipsism.) In this particular case, science adopts the idea of unchanging laws as a methodological assumption rather than an axiom. Similarly, science need not, and will not, be hobbled by the "infinite number of unfalsifiable theories" that you raise. In effect, science tables all these fanciful objections unless and until circumstances and evidence make them relevant. Scence is not metaphysics - it is not attempting to deduce how the world must be; it is trying to find out how it is, and so the sort of arguments that philosophers get entangled in (such as "possible worlds" arguments which ultimately reduce to what a given philosopher can imagine) don't carry much weight. This is not just "something akin" to Occam's razor; it is precisely that, and it is not a vague preference for "beauty" or "elegance". Elsewhere, Hossenfelder made an insightful comment about falsifiability, along the lines that falsifiability is just table stakes for a hypothesis to make the grade as a theory, and not a guarantor of merit.
- mannykannot 6y ago> I could make a theory that says that gravity works exactly as we think it does, except in about 1000 years will cease to function entirely. I suppose you could - but this vacuous armchair theorizing, which, I hope, took you less than a minute to dream up, has no bearing on scientific theories of gravity, which are based on what has been observed. This does not depend on any concept of 'simplicity' or 'elegance', but, at most, on Occam's razor (which is not, as Wikipedia claims, a matter of "the simplest explanation is usually the right one": it is a matter of eliminating premises that are not explaining anything beyond what can already be explained.)
- whimsicalism 6y agoOh yeah, Occam's razor has nothing to do with any concept of "simplicity". /s You're literally stumbling into my conclusion and then arguing that it is different from what I was saying. You can even look at my other replies to you referencing Occam's Razor as exactly the sort of thing I'm talking about.
- mannykannot 6y agoYour sarcasm reflects back on you, as explained by my concurrent edit to my point, which I will repeat here: Occam's razor is not, as Wikipedia claims, a matter of "the simplest explanation is usually the right one": it is a matter of eliminating premises that are not explaining anything beyond what can already be explained. Your armchair "hypothesis" that, in about 1000 years, gravity will cease to function entirely, is not something that needs to be explained.
- whimsicalism 6y agoRather than delving into whether additional assumptions is related to the complexity of a theory, which I think is a largely pedantic debate, I think we don't disagree as much as you perceive. > not something that needs to be explained I agree, and I'm saying that Sabine is discounting the same tool that you used to reject my hypothesis. That is my point. If there is an explanation for BHIP that does not introduce any new assumptions or very small assumptions to existing theory, that lends it credence even in the absence of direct observations of black holes, just as we lack direct observation of gravity 1000 years from now.
- mr_toad 6y agoIsn’t the information loss problem hypothetical in the first place? I doubt anyone has seriously tried to observe information coming out of a black hole.
- lokedhs 6y agoI'm not a physicist so if I got anything wrong, please correct me. The problem is that information conservation is a fundamental part of quantum mechanics. QM is a hugely successful theory which has proven itself to be accurate to absolutely incredible precision. The black hole information paradox implies that there is no way for information to escape the black hole, breaking conservation of information. The implications of this is huge: Either information can escape a black hole, which suggests general relativity is wrong. Or information cannot escape a black hole, in which case QM is wrong. So the key to coming up with a solution to this problem is to explain what happens without breaking physics. One suggestion have been that the information actually never enters the black hole in the first place, it's just spread out over the surface of the event horizon.
- pdonis 6y ago> The black hole information paradox implies that there is no way for information to escape the black hole Not quite. When Hawking radiation is included, it becomes possible in principle for information to escape the hole. That's not the main issue. The main issue is that any information carried by an object that falls into the hole and hits the singularity inside the black hole gets destroyed. So either that information is lost, which violates QM unitarity, or the information has to get copied into the Hawking radiation that gets emitted, which violates the QM no cloning theorem. > One suggestion have been that the information actually never enters the black hole in the first place, it's just spread out over the surface of the event horizon. This doesn't really help, because the information can't just stop at the horizon; if an object falls in, it carries its information with it. So "spread out over the surface of the event horizon" really has to mean the information gets copied there, which, as above, violates the QM no cloning theorem. Some physicists, such as Susskind, claim that this actually isn't an issue because no single observer will ever observe both copies of the information, but this argument strikes me as contrived (and I don't think it's been proven that it must be the case). Two possible resolutions that seem to me to at least avoid the problems I stated above are: (1) Quantum gravity effects change the singularity inside the black hole to something else: one commonly suggested possibility is that a "baby universe" is born there, and that baby universe carries the information that fell into the hole. In other words, the information stays inside the hole and doesn't come out in the Hawking radiation, but it doesn't get destroyed either. (2) Quantum gravity effects prevent a true event horizon and a true black hole from ever forming in the first place. That means there is never any singularity or any place where information ever gets destroyed; quantum gravity effects end up converting all of the objects that fell into the "hole" (which is now not a true black hole, but will still look like one to us on the outside, at least for a very long time) into the Hawking radiation that the hole emits as it evaporates. So no information ever gets destroyed and no information ever gets cloned.