6 ms·
> And without data, the question is not which solution to the problem is correct, but which one you like best. I think this is correct to some extent, ultimate
by whimsicalism 6y ago
> And without data, the question is not which solution to the problem is correct, but which one you like best.
I think this is correct to some extent, ultimately unavoidable, and some assumptions can be "inferred" as more reasonable than others, even in the absence of falsification.
By Sabine's stance, the problem of induction [0] hasn't been "solved" because we actually have no reason to assume that past events are at all related to future events. So when we say that induction is possible, we say so because we "like best" that theory of causality, rather than my alternate theory that when you finish reading this sentence, all physics will cease to function and the universe will end.
It didn't happen, but we had no reason to know so ahead of time deductively. However, it is still reasonable (in my view) to believe in induction.
So sure, it's perhaps 'unsolvable', but if a plausible explanation comes around that is consistent with modern physics that seems good to me.
[0]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
- tsimionescu 6y agoAs far as I understand, there are plenty of plausible explanations that are consistent with modern physics. The problem is finding out which one of them (if any) is right, since they are not all mutually compatible.
- whimsicalism 6y agoSure, but I think there's a difference between "if we conjecture this additional effect that has never been observed but is not inconsistent with observation, then we see this thing" vs. "actually this is sort of resolved by a straightforward application of solutions to models we already had of effects we have already observed"
- shaded-enmity 6y agoI'm confused, isn't the whole schtick around past events being related to future events the basis of causality?
- ethanbond 6y agoRight, and GP point is that we actually only have data about how past events are related to other past events (and even then, the data is not very good). We have no information at all about how past or current events are related to future events.
- burrows 6y agoWhat evidence do we have that causality will continue to “exist”?
- waterhouse 6y agoPeople who believe that past experience is a good predictor of the future will make decent predictions as a result; people who believe that past experience has nothing to do with the future ("anti-inductivists") will make wrong predictions again and again. The inductivists will therefore outcompete the anti-inductivists. On the other hand, as a friend of mine pointed out, for the anti-inductivists that manage to exist, although they keep suffering from making wrong predictions, they will not see this as a reason to change their philosophy, so they are stuck in an epistemic trap. Since evidence has no meaning for them, no evidence can change their minds.
- whimsicalism 6y ago> The inductivists will therefore outcompete the anti-inductivists. You have no deductive or a priori reason to know this, rhetoric about "epistemically traps" aside.
- shaded-enmity 6y agoSo is this survivorship bias or something else? I don't understand your point. I have a white wall in front of me. If I take a brush and red paint and paint a big red circle on the wall, are you saying that the big red circle "just happens to be there" with no relationship to the brush, red paint and my actions?
- pessimizer 6y agoThis is a problem with "philosophical" induction, not logical induction. I don't even know what it means "to believe in [philosophical] induction." Does it mean to believe that future things will behave like things similar to them in the past, except when they don't, in which case we made a mistake in thinking they were similar?
- tsimionescu 6y ago> Does it mean to believe that future things will behave like things similar to them in the past, except when they don't, in which case we made a mistake in thinking they were similar? It's somewhat more fundamental than that: it's attacking the idea that experience can be used in any way. Not believing in inductive reasoning would mean being constantly surprised at everything you see, as it's theoretically just as likely that an object that you saw 1 second ago will disappear as it is that it will not. You would be surprised every day that the sun has risen again.
- pdonis 6y ago> By Sabine's stance, the problem of induction [0] hasn't been "solved" The "problem" of induction is a different kind of problem from the black hole information loss problem. Induction can't be tested against experimental data. Induction isn't a testable hypothesis; it's a strategy we have no choice but to adopt if we want to plan for the future at all. So there is no "problem" of induction at all: it's just something we're stuck with. Proposed solutions to the black hole information loss problem can be tested against experimental data; we just don't have the technical capability to acquire such data yet. That doesn't change the fact that until proposed solutions are tested against experimental data, and some proposed solution passes the test, the black hole information loss problem is not solved.
- enkid 6y agoThe problem if induction attacks the idea of experiments leading to anything meaningful.
- whimsicalism 6y agoMy point is that there are always going to be equally possible alternative theories which make any problem "unsolvable". I could make a theory that says that gravity works exactly as we think it does, except in about 1000 years will cease to function entirely - and that theory would be equally consistent with observation. I would be equally correct in saying that we do not yet posses the technology (time travel) to falsify this theory. We have to rely on some sort of proxy for the simplicity or elegance of the theory in order to preclude hypotheses like the above. If we find an elegant solution to the BHIP that uses existing QM + GR (which are empirically verified), then that seems like a pretty good resolution even if it can't be observationally verified directly at a black hole yet.
- pdonis 6y ago> We have to rely on some sort of proxy for the simplicity or elegance of the theory in order to preclude hypotheses like the above. No, we don't. The rule that precludes your hypothesis is much simpler: the laws of physics don't change with time. That doesn't require the laws of physics to be "simple" or "elegant", and doesn't require anyone's subjective judgment about which laws of physics they think are more beautiful.