3 ms·
This is incorrect. Both 737Max crashes took place during normal flight regimes, and they happened because of faulty AOA sensors. Pilots have multiple ways of de
by dreamcompiler 6y ago
This is incorrect. Both 737Max crashes took place during normal flight regimes, and they happened because of faulty AOA sensors. Pilots have multiple ways of determining AOA and would never have been fooled by a single bad sensor.
Finally, recovering from a stall (even if one happened, which it didn't in either crash) is Day 1 of every flight training course. It is probably the most basic and thoroughly-drilled skill in all of flying.
- rootusrootus 6y ago> Both 737Max crashes took place during normal flight regimes I expected to see this fallacy. MCAS does not operate normally during any flight regime routinely encountered. It should remain entirely inactive until things get more exciting than they should ever get on a passenger flight. What you are talking about is a malfunctioning MCAS, which isn't operating by design. > recovering from a stall (even if one happened, which it didn't in either crash) is Day 1 of every flight training course Yes, of course it is. It is also very rarely encountered by passenger jets, and when it does happen things are very exciting indeed. Your odds of hitting the ground have already gone up quite dramatically at that point, MCAS or not.
- dreamcompiler 6y ago> MCAS does not operate normally during any flight regime routinely encountered. I'm aware of this. I'm also aware that it failed twice within a couple of months -- which is far too frequently -- and the consequences of each failure were complete loss of the airframe. Anybody who has ever done risk analysis can see that MCAS was improperly designed and poorly implemented and the people who signed off on it should probably go to jail. No new system whose failure could result in all souls lost and is known to have a single point of vulnerability should ever have been added to a commercial passenger aircraft. Period.