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> and it is perfectly stable Was thought to be perfectly stable. Turns out it wasn't, in their new edition. > problem is that the new MCAS was much worse It'

> and it is perfectly stable Was thought to be perfectly stable. Turns out it wasn't, in their new edition. > problem is that the new MCAS was much worse It's common in airplane industry to never blame users nor the instruments, but the process. Things should be able to fail, and pilots should be able to recover. Now both Boeing and the FAA failed catastrophically in their certification process, leading to missing vital information about the MCAS. Overall the core problem wasn't the MCAS but the process (or lack of process) that didn't find out the edge-cases where it didn't work.

rob74 6y ago
As with most aviation accidents, you always have a chain of things that have to fail. If memory serves, any one of the following would probably have prevented the accidents: - if Boeing would have designed MCAS better - if anyone inside Boeing or the FAA would have flagged the bad design before the accidents - if Boeing would have enabled the "Angle of attack sensor disagree alert" by default on all MAX airplanes (https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/64020/is-the-737-maxs-aoa-disagreement-warning-light-an-actual-light https://aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/64020/is-the-73...) - if the issues with the AOA sensors on the crashed planes would have been fixed before the accidents