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I don't think your case is very good. I read through that paper, which is not very much about the treaties, but I also didn't find any compelling arguments that

I don't think your case is very good. I read through that paper, which is not very much about the treaties, but I also didn't find any compelling arguments that the treaties say more than below. What I gather they say is Japan gives up rights to the SCS and territories they siezed from China are returned to China (RPC, ROC, whatever). However it doesn't say the Spratlys and the Paracels are returned to China, for example because Japan seized them from China. I agree with your last points - the larger picture is that China can claim whatever they want, but their arguments aren't good enough to get the approval of major world players. So they'll have to protect their position with force or trading favors.

dirtyid 6y ago
It's not my case. It's summary of ROC/PRC argument, which predates others and had garnered major international support in a time when these disputes had no geopolitical relevance. Now it does, so the the ambiguities in language gets re-prosecuted, and is exactly what everyone nitpicks over. China thinks it sufficiently transfers islands over to Chinese sovereignty, Philippines doesn't, hence the dispute. There's also historic claims vs UNCLOS regulation, what supersedes what with 6 parties + US, it's a mess. Really, the only viable settlement mechanism will be hard power. Which is inevitable, even in the 60s when significant countries were fine with Chinese claims, these legalities barely mattered to resolving the disputes since no interested party had the power to enforce anything. There's so much resources and security tied to maritime control in this region that this is only a dispute that can be solved through force. Along the same lines, it doesn't matter what regional or major world players think about Chinese legal arguments if China can enforce it via tonnage. Right now the only viable opposition is USN + FONAPS. But that's kind of status quo US+China is comfortable with, everyone dick waves without touching tips. The important point in terms of "claims" is where previously plurality parties endorsed Chinese legal nitpicks (hence China has the earliest and strongest claims), now they do not, not because other claimants have better arguments, but because geopolitical interests changed. The quality of the arguments do not matter, nor the laws if we're honest. China explicitly did not submit to UNCLOS arbitration mechanism, so the PCA ruling hack was not to decide on sovereignty but maritime boundary but defining what is / is not features to deprive China (and other countries) of EEZ and territoriality. Right now China "adheres" by limiting weaponization, and drafting other legal arguments to legitimize holdings for more territorial perks. But that's just a stalling tactic until Chinese Navy is large enough to control the region defacto.
- akvadrako 6y ago
  > It's not my case. It's summary of ROC/PRC argument, which predates others and had garnered major international support in a time when these disputes had no geopolitical relevance. This is what I don't agree with. It seems you were referring to those treaties to show that the world accepted China's argument. But I don't see the evidence of that; at most they were just non-committal. Of course it matters how good their argument is – if it was stronger than enough countries would be interested in maintaining stable international order to back them up.
  - dirtyid 6y ago
    To circle back, the original comment was that PRC claims had no legitimate basis in history and law. I pointed out ROC claims were based of both law and history, with enough tacit endorsement (by security members and other claimants) at the time that in terms of consensus, Chinese claims constitute the oldest and strongest among all claimants. Which is true. PRC inherited these claims, and the argument has not changed, only the geopolitical context has. Especially post UNCLOS when ownership granted EEZs and other territorial perks, and now SCS SLOCs and resource claims. >Of course it matters how good their argument is – if it was stronger than enough countries would be interested in maintaining stable international order to back them up. No international actor wants a regional Asian hegemony except China, there's no argument strong enough to override such interests. And there's no argument strong enough to form consensus among 6 claimants or US desire for Chinese containment. SCS is simply not a dispute that can be solved legally / multilaterally anymore, unless bilaterally under Chinese terms like original UNCLOS accession conditions. In the meantime, China has the industrial capacity change the conditions on the ground. Probably the most expedient method now, hence arguing over claims is not productive. The claims exist with clear historical documentation, for pretense of Chinese enforcement, that's all that matters.

dirtyid 6y ago

It's not my case. It's summary of ROC/PRC argument, which predates others and had garnered major international support in a time when these disputes had no geopolitical relevance. Now it does, so the the ambiguities in language gets re-prosecuted, and is exactly what everyone nitpicks over. China thinks it sufficiently transfers islands over to Chinese sovereignty, Philippines doesn't, hence the dispute. There's also historic claims vs UNCLOS regulation, what supersedes what with 6 parties + US, it's a mess. Really, the only viable settlement mechanism will be hard power. Which is inevitable, even in the 60s when significant countries were fine with Chinese claims, these legalities barely mattered to resolving the disputes since no interested party had the power to enforce anything. There's so much resources and security tied to maritime control in this region that this is only a dispute that can be solved through force. Along the same lines, it doesn't matter what regional or major world players think about Chinese legal arguments if China can enforce it via tonnage. Right now the only viable opposition is USN + FONAPS. But that's kind of status quo US+China is comfortable with, everyone dick waves without touching tips. The important point in terms of "claims" is where previously plurality parties endorsed Chinese legal nitpicks (hence China has the earliest and strongest claims), now they do not, not because other claimants have better arguments, but because geopolitical interests changed. The quality of the arguments do not matter, nor the laws if we're honest. China explicitly did not submit to UNCLOS arbitration mechanism, so the PCA ruling hack was not to decide on sovereignty but maritime boundary but defining what is / is not features to deprive China (and other countries) of EEZ and territoriality. Right now China "adheres" by limiting weaponization, and drafting other legal arguments to legitimize holdings for more territorial perks. But that's just a stalling tactic until Chinese Navy is large enough to control the region defacto.

akvadrako 6y ago
> It's not my case. It's summary of ROC/PRC argument, which predates others and had garnered major international support in a time when these disputes had no geopolitical relevance. This is what I don't agree with. It seems you were referring to those treaties to show that the world accepted China's argument. But I don't see the evidence of that; at most they were just non-committal. Of course it matters how good their argument is – if it was stronger than enough countries would be interested in maintaining stable international order to back them up.
- dirtyid 6y ago
  To circle back, the original comment was that PRC claims had no legitimate basis in history and law. I pointed out ROC claims were based of both law and history, with enough tacit endorsement (by security members and other claimants) at the time that in terms of consensus, Chinese claims constitute the oldest and strongest among all claimants. Which is true. PRC inherited these claims, and the argument has not changed, only the geopolitical context has. Especially post UNCLOS when ownership granted EEZs and other territorial perks, and now SCS SLOCs and resource claims. >Of course it matters how good their argument is – if it was stronger than enough countries would be interested in maintaining stable international order to back them up. No international actor wants a regional Asian hegemony except China, there's no argument strong enough to override such interests. And there's no argument strong enough to form consensus among 6 claimants or US desire for Chinese containment. SCS is simply not a dispute that can be solved legally / multilaterally anymore, unless bilaterally under Chinese terms like original UNCLOS accession conditions. In the meantime, China has the industrial capacity change the conditions on the ground. Probably the most expedient method now, hence arguing over claims is not productive. The claims exist with clear historical documentation, for pretense of Chinese enforcement, that's all that matters.