I'd like to see what the "evidence" could even be in this case. Do we know authors of most other malware? Almost never. Yet here they are naming not one individ

I'd like to see what the "evidence" could even be in this case. Do we know authors of most other malware? Almost never. Yet here they are naming not one individual, but several, and attribute roles to each, and not just any individuals, but purportedly foreign state intelligence operatives whose real identities wouldn't even be known in Russia, let alone in the US, and would not be used as a part of any cyberwarfare operation. And not just naming, which doesn't really require evidence, but indicting, which does have certain evidentiary standards. How do you tell from another end of the wire whether it's these six dudes, or some teenage hacker in his bedroom in Chelyabinsk (or indeed in Slickpoo, Idaho)? How do you tell, moreover, the location from which they are operating? I've actually looked into this in Russian press. Turns out it was easy to find where these folks live, and two of them had court cases for not paying enough tax, which doesn't sound plausible, because if they are government employees taxes are withdrawn automatically. https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20201023-sobesednik-nashel-russkih-hake https://sobesednik.ru/politika/20201023-sobesednik-nashel-ru... Until recently their photos were all over the social media, real names and all. Pliskin in particular had a solo consulting company for a while in 2018 - his name shows up in the government registry. How do you do that if you're working for the GRU? Moreover, some of the largest Russian companies, such as Rosneft and Evraz were hit by NotPetya as well.