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This relies on the problematic approach to deniability of making forgeries possible. To make this work you need to claim a forgery when you know that no such f
by upofadown 6y ago
This relies on the problematic approach to deniability of making forgeries possible.
To make this work you need to claim a forgery when you know that no such forgery occurred. So you explicitly or implicitly have to accuse someone of a serious crime/offence they did not commit. Most people have a greater sense of honour than that. Those that don't would still have to fear getting caught.
If someone actually does forge a message using the old private keys provided by Google then you would have to fight the assumption that you were using the system as it was designed. Everyone would just assume you said it and are now using the possibility of forgery to lie about having said it.
You can always claim a forgery anyway should you decide to do that. Perhaps someone got access to Google's relatively poorly guarded DKIM private key. How would you know? You are probably not making a specific claim anyway.
- avianlyric 6y agoThere should be no need to make claims of forgery. The mere fact that an email can be forged will substantially reduce the likelihood of email being used, unless clear providence can be provided. At the moment that providence can be proved with DKIM. Remove DKIM and now bad actors need to prove that they actually broke into someone’s emails and stole them. A much high bar to pass, especially as it may mean incriminating yourself of a crime. Emails become just as useful as find a pile of top secret papers on the floor. Unless you can prove the source of those papers everyone is going to ignore you.