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> So the author's central thesis essentially seems to boil down to that leaked emails were able to be cryptographically verified, because of DKIM and so we shou
by woodruffw 6y ago
> So the author's central thesis essentially seems to boil down to that leaked emails were able to be cryptographically verified, because of DKIM and so we should prevent that so people can't use email to blackmail politicians? Ultimately I prefer the more information that we can get on politicians available.
I don't think Matthew Green is arguing against transparency. What he's observing is that non-repudiation is an unintentional byproduct of DKIM's design. Because it's a byproduct, DKIM's users have made implementation decisions that make it susceptible to weaknesses in the unintentional non-repudiation property.
By 2030, a motivated nation state will probably have the ability to crack the 2048-bit RSA keys that Google is currently using for DKIM. Do you really want someone in 2031 to be able to contrive fake signatures for the emails of politicians in 2021?
- beagle3 6y agoWell, by 2030 the non-repudiation will be considered lost if that’s the case. Maybe even 2027. But today, in 2020, a verified DKIM is strong indication about the identity of the writer, or that the keys weren’t safely stored.
- woodruffw 6y ago> Maybe even 2027. But today, in 2020, a verified DKIM is strong indication about the identity of the writer, or that the keys weren’t safely stored. Except that we're talking about leaks of emails that date back by years: the earliest Podesta emails are from 2010, back when Google was using 512-bit (!) keys for DKIM. Those were leaked in 2016, at which point 1024-bit keys were already considered crackable by a motivated attacker. This isn't to say that those emails were faked, only that "an email written in 2020 that's verifiable in 2020" is not the target of interest.
- beagle3 6y ago..... so? That means in 2016, the DKIM was already deniable. And it made no difference whatsoever. The DKIM signature is proof only that whoever signed the email possessed the key, nothing more, nothing less. This, in turn, is a suggestion about the identity of the signer and possibly the author - but not proof. Did DKIM change anything about the podesta emails? Or were they basically acknowledged as authentic regardless, and had a lot of other verifyable info in them?
- woodruffw 6y ago> ..... so? That means in 2016, the DKIM was already deniable. And it made no difference whatsoever. Both journalists and investigative groups (and conspiracy theorists) treat DKIM as a sign of authenticity, even when the key material is long past its prime. Wikileaks still prominently displays a "verified" marker next to their archives. > Did DKIM change anything about the podesta emails? Or were they basically acknowledged as authentic regardless, and had a lot of other verifyable info in them? That's hard to say, but it's also not the point. The point with being able to crack the key is that a motivated party could intersperse false information with otherwise verifiable information. And, well, what's a conspiracy theorist to do? Only believe the non-juicy parts?
- beagle3 6y agoI don’t understand the fascination with DKIM on this thread. Yes, journalists verified it. But they consider it supporting data, just as they wouldn’t automatically ignore any email that had no DKIM signature. Phone calls are never authenticated. Does anyone automatically believe or disbelieve recorded phone calls? I mean, “conspiracy theorists” (in the common usage of that terms) already believe only what they want to believe.
- woodruffw 6y agoI don't think it's a fascination, it's what the OP is about. We're talking about the subject of a blog post, no? I think the point boils down to expectation management: journalists (and ...) barely understand non-repudiation, much less why each of the following scenarios pans out: * 2006 email + 512-bit RSA, leaked in 2006: probably authentic * 2008 email + 512-bit RSA, leaked in 2012: potentially inauthentic * 2008 email + 1024-bit RSA, leaked in 2008: probably authentic * 2008 email + 1024-bit RSA, leaked in 2016: potentially inauthentic ...and so on. In sum: we're making life harder for the people doing real investigative work (since they're not technical), and we're giving fodder to the people who want to conspiracize. All because we're using a spam mitigation technique to provide properties that it was never intended to provide.
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- stouset 6y agoI haven't the faintest why this conversation is only about politicians. I don't want a nation-state to be able to contrive fake historical signatures for my own emails.
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- pvg 6y agoA sufficiently powerful adversary will simply steal your emails. That's the actual real threat, not that the adversary will convincingly lie about you. That part they can already do without the benefit of your emails.
- dredmorbius 6y agoAn adversary with sufficient impunity will simply lie and make things up. DKIM without rotation and disclosure provides the capacity to do so with cryptographically provable integrity. Green's paper lists instances in which this has happened (as a proof-of-concept demmostration of the risk), and may have happened. DKIM key rotation and public key disclosure at least denies adversaries this.
- greenkey 6y ago> Do you really want someone in 2031 to be able to contrive fake signatures for the emails of politicians in 2021? How could it be used for that purpose then if it’s proven to be unreliable? It would seem that there’s more to gain in the short-term by those that have hacked Gmail accounts by exposing this, so it seems disingenuous, which you have to know, so it seems like people are fake-goading Google, causing others to actually goad Google, maybe to try to expose those that have hacked Gmail... Pretty sneaky sis!
- dredmorbius 6y agoHow could it be used for that purpose then if it’s proven to be unreliable? The distinction is in removing any doubt as to reliability.
- tsimionescu 6y ago> By 2030, a motivated nation state will probably have the ability to crack the 2048-bit RSA keys that Google is currently using for DKIM. Do you really want someone in 2031 to be able to contrive fake signatures for the emails of politicians in 2021? By this logic, what the article is arguing for is to bring that same truth today: if DKIM no longer offers the same guarantees, but people think that it does, than it can trivially be used to forge emails that people will then wrongly trust, which is obviously worse than the status quo. Of course, the more likely result is what the article suggests - if the scheme can be defeated, people will stop trusting it, and there will be no chance of forgery (at least not for very much longer).