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Perversely, this solution could result in MORE emails being hacked MORE OFTEN. Allow me to explain. If a hacker were to retrieve some emails before the DKIM ke
by hammock 6y ago
Perversely, this solution could result in MORE emails being hacked MORE OFTEN. Allow me to explain.
If a hacker were to retrieve some emails before the DKIM key was made public, they could then sign their hacked emails with their own timestamped signature, proving that they are in fact authentic (since the signed timestamp shows that they were retrieved before the DKIM key was released).
Therefore, by rotating the DKIM keys "every few weeks" you are giving the would-be hackers a deadline to retrieve the target emails - a few weeks - which could lead to hackers preemptively hacking as many possibly useful accounts as possible (not just the ones they know they want at a given moment), every few weeks.
(The merits of OP's argument notwithstanding)
- hyperpape 6y agoYour threat model appears to be that most email providers are hacked a substantial percent of the time, right? What defenses of anything are going to work with that threat model?
- adrianmonk 6y agoYou don't necessarily have to hack the provider. You can hack the user's laptop and siphon the data out of their email client. If they use a web client, you can read the files it caches. Or maybe you can set up IMAP and have your malware read a copy of everything. To the email provider, all of this just looks like the user is reading their email.
- hyperpape 6y agoFair, though I think it's still true that it's a very difficult threat model. Also worth noting that email clients typically tell you about new logins/clients (though I don't think their way of doing it is particularly robust).
- lolc 6y agoIf crackers could justify the resources, they would already now be doing more cracking. It's not like they can just scale their operations ten times all else staying equal. The proposed change in key rotation and publication makes fresh mails only more valuable relative to old messages, not more valuable in general. If we're looking at cracking-activities from an economic point of view, publishing DKIM keys makes the cracking harder: 1. More accounts need to be cracked fast 2. Timestamped signatures must be published in a timely way 3. Results must be stored until they become useful These things not only increase cracking expenses, they also increase the threat of detection.