3 ms·
Yes, I've seen that episode of Game of Thrones too :) First, consider the requirements to set such a trap. The authors of the document need to be actively conc
by piaste 6y ago
Yes, I've seen that episode of Game of Thrones too :)
First, consider the requirements to set such a trap. The authors of the document need to be actively concerned about a leaker, and to be OK with the document itself being leaked as long as they catch the culprit - at the same time, they need the document to be juicy enough that it will be leaked. They need to share the document in such a way that no two of the suspects will be able to compare notes, otherwise the jig is up. So no putting the file on a common internal resource (unless the server can stealthily serve different versions based on the user's login data); no attachments, else a reply all / forward would reveal the trap; no collaboration; no physical office where two suspects may see each other's copy.
Is that still possible? Yes. But a _lot_ of times it won't be possible, and the would-be leaker will know it's not possible. It's much more likely, and makes much more sense, for critical documents to be shared in such a way that the users _know_ they are fingerprinted, and won't leak them. IIRC, major Hollywood studios do that with their film scripts.
Second, what if the _key phrases_ are slightly altered in each version? Or hell, if your bosses want to finger you so bad, what's if they changed a small factual detail in each version? Then even the journalist quotes would reveal the leaker.
- bobthepanda 6y agoThe not-so-great news is that common characters like spaces and semicolons have various similar-looking characters defined in Unicode, which would not be very noticeable to a human but would be noticeable to a machine. So you just need to do random substitutions that uniquely identify the document and you'll have a fingerprint. It wouldn't be very challenging to do and it wouldn't be very challenging of a record to maintain. You also don't need to uniquely identify it to a person; you just need to narrow the search space and then apply other techniques that would narrow it down. If it's a version of a document that leaked through an email chain then you've just limited the search space to the recipients, which is still plenty useful.