5 ms·
If you catch malware in the wild you don’t want to wait half a day for the cache to expire. Negative responses are typically cached for short periods of time.
by Spivak 6y ago
If you catch malware in the wild you don’t want to wait half a day for the cache to expire.
Negative responses are typically cached for short periods of time. Can you imagine if people cached NXDOMAIN for half a day and someone creating a record had to wait 12 hours for it to go live because someone queried it?
- _qulr 6y ago> If you catch malware in the wild you don’t want to wait half a day for the cache to expire. But if you have a cached OCSP response for the cert of a malware author, then you've already launched their app, so it's probably too late.
- zepto 6y agoPlenty of kinds of malware are harmful each time they are launched, not just once.
- ethbr0 6y agoThe risk of launching malware a second+ time seems substantially less than the privacy leak caused by more frequent checks.
- zepto 6y agohttps://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-update-kills-off-zoom-web-server/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-update-kills-off-zoom-we... This was a seriously exploitable issue that was a problem every time it was run. I agree that this certificate mechanism is absurdly problematic. That doesn’t justify dismissing the security risks it was intended to prevent.
- _qulr 6y agoZoom isn't malware, Apple did not revoke Zoom's Developer ID certificate, and indeed Zoom still exists on the Mac. Zoom had a serious uninstaller bug, but that's all it was, and it's not relevant to the current discussion.
- zepto 6y agoIncorrect - zoom exposed a serious vulnerability, and Apple shut it down, using another mechanism but nonetheless the same effect. It’s relevant because you argue that there is no value to having the ability to do this. It is also a problem which occurred every time the app was launched. Something you have dismissed as a non problem. https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/10/20689644/apple-zoom-web-server-automatic-removal-silent-update-webcam-vulnerability https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/10/20689644/apple-zoom-web-s...
- _qulr 6y ago> using another mechanism > It’s relevant because you argue that there is no value to having the ability to do this. No, I did not. We haven't talked about that other mechanism, so I've said nothing about it here either positively or negatively. > Something you have dismissed as a non problem. I said "Zoom had a serious uninstaller bug". So no, I did not dismiss it as a non problem. It just has nothing to do with Developer ID certificate OCSP. Please stop putting words in my mouth or completely warping the words that I do say.
- zepto 6y agoNo warping going on. You said “But if you have a cached OCSP response for the cert of a malware author, then you've already launched their app, so it's probably too late.” I.e. once you have launched the app, the damage is done. This is not the case, and the Zoom situation is a clear counterexample. Even if a problematic app has been launched one or more times, it is still worth preventing subsequent launches if you can. It doesn’t matter what mechanism is used to prevent the subsequent launch. This applies to any mechanism including OCSP. The Zoom example is a refutation of the particular point you made, a point which dismisses a real security concern. It demonstrates that there is value in Apple having the ability to prevent harmful software from running, no matter how many times it has already been run.
- _qulr 6y ago> This is not the case, and the Zoom situation is a clear counterexample. I was talking about MALWARE. As I said before, Zoom is not malware, so no, it's not a counterexample. This is my last reply to you. You're clearly not interested in having a good faith conversation, you continue to misinterpret me and want to score "internet points" or something. I'm done.
- tsimionescu 6y agoIf you care about user privacy, you don't upload stuff from the user side, you download the list of trusted&untrusted certificates to the user's machine and take the decision there. This is how antiviruses have always worked, without affecting user privacy (of course, most antiviruses also did other things that DID affect user privacy, but malware detection at least worked perfectly fine without it).