7 ms·

I feel Apple has done privacy well in so many cases, that the way this works is really disappointing :-/

by olliej 6y ago

smnrchrds 6y ago
Apple has done a fantastic PR job regarding privacy. I am more skeptical about the status of actual privacy given their iMessage situation and now this.
- olliej 6y ago
  Their iMessage situation?
  - smnrchrds 6y ago
    They backup the private key to iCloud unless you manually disable backups. So even though iMessage is advertised as E2E encrypted, for the vast majority of users, Apple can read each and every message. (And even if you disable backups, Apple can still read most if not all of your messages, because the persons on the other side of the conversations have not disabled backups)
    - catlifeonmars 6y ago
      Can Apple read your iCloud storage? I’m not saying that it is, but shouldn’t that be encrypted at rest with a customer-specific key?
      - EwanToo 6y ago
        I don't have any detailed knowledge of it, but I've seen various similar comments based on this article and similar ones: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
      - claudeganon 6y ago
        Yeah, they can read everything: https://sneak.berlin/20200604/if-zoom-is-wrong-so-is-apple/ https://sneak.berlin/20200604/if-zoom-is-wrong-so-is-apple/ They were going to actually encrypt it, but suddenly had a change of heart after the FBI had a chat with them: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
        catlifeonmars 6y ago
        Ugh
    - tlburke 6y ago
      It's worth noting that Google, the big bad guys of privacy, uses a proper E2E encryption scheme.
      - olliej 6y ago
        iMessages is e2e encrypted, so I’m not sure what you’re saying here
    - Spivak 6y ago
      This stance undermines the point of E2E. The messaging system is still E2E even if people backup their plaintext messages or their key on non-E2E storage. Having you messages deleted because you forgot your iCloud password is good security but a terrible default.
  - tandav 6y ago
    https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25078317 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25078317
- nojito 6y ago
  Calling Apple's privacy stance PR is extremely misleading. It's been engrained in them since the 80s and with the growth of Google, it became fun to vilify Apple because of it.
- jay_kyburz 6y ago
  And their participation in PRISM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28surveillance_program%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28surveillance_program%...
  - dewey 6y ago
    I thought you just ended up in PRISM you don't "join" it? Just like Google found out from the Snowden leaks and then encrypted all their DC to DC fiber.
    - agency 6y ago
      I think there were aspects of PRISM that required cooperation from providers like Google. Like the NSA would send queries to them and they would return emails or what have you that match those queries. Though of course this “cooperation” is required by law.
      - dewey 6y ago
        If there's a court order, (FISA: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act_of_1978_Amendments_Act_of_2008 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveilla..., or otherwise) companies have to comply. So I don't really see how one can blame a any company for that.
        xvector 6y ago
        You can absolutely blame companies, specifically Apple, because many things are not E2EE when they could be.
        sneak 6y ago
        https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
        agency 6y ago
- deleted 6y ago
  [deleted]
ghayes 6y ago
A better privacy solution would be to sync revocation lists every so often (and, if you must, right before opening a new app). Is there any privacy-preserving reason to not go this direction? How often would you expect certificates to be rescinded? You could also use a bloom filter to significantly reduce the false-positive rate.
- olliej 6y ago
  CRLs are how we dealt with OCSP in the browser, and I feel like those must surely have more insanity than the Developer ID certs
- catlifeonmars 6y ago
  Or something akin to OCSP stapling, which has been mentioned in a few places?
  - tialaramex 6y ago
    Stapling makes sense for the Web but not here. With OCSP Stapling the remote web server whose identity you want to assure yourself of periodically gets an up-to-date OCSP answer about its own certificate. When you connect to that server, it gives you the certificate, and the OCSP answer, which assures you that the certificate is still good, and is signed by the Issuer of the certificate. So, you visit Porn Hub, Porn Hub knows you visited and can reasonably guess it's because you like porn (duh). Porn Hub talks to their CA. The CA knows Porn Hub are Porn Hub and could reasonably guess it's a porn site (duh) but this way the CA doesn't learn that you visited Porn Hub. That's Privacy preserving. Nobody learns anything you'd reasonably expect they shouldn't know. But how can we apply that to an application on your Mac? If every app reaches out from your Mac to Apple to get OCSP responses, they learn what you have installed, albeit I guess you can avoid telling them when exactly you ran it. This is enormously more costly and not very privacy preserving. CRL-based ideas are much better for your privacy, although they might cost you some network traffic when the CRL is updated. Of course one reason for Apple not to want to do CRLs is that they're transparent and Apple is not a very transparent type of company. With OCSP you've got no way to know if and when Apple revoked the certificate for "Obvious Malware II the sequel" or equally for "Very Popular App that Apple says violated an obscure sub-clause of a developer agreement". But with CRLs it'd be easier for any researcher to monitor periodically for revocations, giving insights that Apple might not like. Do revocations happen only 9-5 Mon-Fri Cupertino time? Are there dozens per hour? Per day? Per Year?

I feel Apple has done privacy well in so many cases, that the way this works is really disappointing :-/

by olliej 6y ago

I feel Apple has done privacy well in so many cases, that the way this works is really disappointing :-/

Apple has done a fantastic PR job regarding privacy. I am more skeptical about the status of actual privacy given their iMessage situation and now this.

olliej 6y ago
Their iMessage situation?
- smnrchrds 6y ago
  They backup the private key to iCloud unless you manually disable backups. So even though iMessage is advertised as E2E encrypted, for the vast majority of users, Apple can read each and every message. (And even if you disable backups, Apple can still read most if not all of your messages, because the persons on the other side of the conversations have not disabled backups)
  - catlifeonmars 6y ago
    Can Apple read your iCloud storage? I’m not saying that it is, but shouldn’t that be encrypted at rest with a customer-specific key?
    - EwanToo 6y ago
      I don't have any detailed knowledge of it, but I've seen various similar comments based on this article and similar ones: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
    - claudeganon 6y ago
      Yeah, they can read everything: https://sneak.berlin/20200604/if-zoom-is-wrong-so-is-apple/ https://sneak.berlin/20200604/if-zoom-is-wrong-so-is-apple/ They were going to actually encrypt it, but suddenly had a change of heart after the FBI had a chat with them: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
      - catlifeonmars 6y ago
        Ugh
  - tlburke 6y ago
    It's worth noting that Google, the big bad guys of privacy, uses a proper E2E encryption scheme.
    - olliej 6y ago
      iMessages is e2e encrypted, so I’m not sure what you’re saying here
  - Spivak 6y ago
    This stance undermines the point of E2E. The messaging system is still E2E even if people backup their plaintext messages or their key on non-E2E storage. Having you messages deleted because you forgot your iCloud password is good security but a terrible default.
- tandav 6y ago
  https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25078317 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=25078317
nojito 6y ago
Calling Apple's privacy stance PR is extremely misleading. It's been engrained in them since the 80s and with the growth of Google, it became fun to vilify Apple because of it.
jay_kyburz 6y ago
And their participation in PRISM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28surveillance_program%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM_%28surveillance_program%...
- dewey 6y ago
  I thought you just ended up in PRISM you don't "join" it? Just like Google found out from the Snowden leaks and then encrypted all their DC to DC fiber.
  - agency 6y ago
    I think there were aspects of PRISM that required cooperation from providers like Google. Like the NSA would send queries to them and they would return emails or what have you that match those queries. Though of course this “cooperation” is required by law.
    - dewey 6y ago
      If there's a court order, (FISA: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillance_Act_of_1978_Amendments_Act_of_2008 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Intelligence_Surveilla..., or otherwise) companies have to comply. So I don't really see how one can blame a any company for that.
      - xvector 6y ago
        You can absolutely blame companies, specifically Apple, because many things are not E2EE when they could be.
      - sneak 6y ago
        https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
      - agency 6y ago
deleted 6y ago
[deleted]

ghayes 6y ago

A better privacy solution would be to sync revocation lists every so often (and, if you must, right before opening a new app). Is there any privacy-preserving reason to not go this direction? How often would you expect certificates to be rescinded? You could also use a bloom filter to significantly reduce the false-positive rate.

olliej 6y ago
CRLs are how we dealt with OCSP in the browser, and I feel like those must surely have more insanity than the Developer ID certs
catlifeonmars 6y ago
Or something akin to OCSP stapling, which has been mentioned in a few places?
- tialaramex 6y ago
  Stapling makes sense for the Web but not here. With OCSP Stapling the remote web server whose identity you want to assure yourself of periodically gets an up-to-date OCSP answer about its own certificate. When you connect to that server, it gives you the certificate, and the OCSP answer, which assures you that the certificate is still good, and is signed by the Issuer of the certificate. So, you visit Porn Hub, Porn Hub knows you visited and can reasonably guess it's because you like porn (duh). Porn Hub talks to their CA. The CA knows Porn Hub are Porn Hub and could reasonably guess it's a porn site (duh) but this way the CA doesn't learn that you visited Porn Hub. That's Privacy preserving. Nobody learns anything you'd reasonably expect they shouldn't know. But how can we apply that to an application on your Mac? If every app reaches out from your Mac to Apple to get OCSP responses, they learn what you have installed, albeit I guess you can avoid telling them when exactly you ran it. This is enormously more costly and not very privacy preserving. CRL-based ideas are much better for your privacy, although they might cost you some network traffic when the CRL is updated. Of course one reason for Apple not to want to do CRLs is that they're transparent and Apple is not a very transparent type of company. With OCSP you've got no way to know if and when Apple revoked the certificate for "Obvious Malware II the sequel" or equally for "Very Popular App that Apple says violated an obscure sub-clause of a developer agreement". But with CRLs it'd be easier for any researcher to monitor periodically for revocations, giving insights that Apple might not like. Do revocations happen only 9-5 Mon-Fri Cupertino time? Are there dozens per hour? Per day? Per Year?