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That chart is not of competing technologies, but of market demand and one technology. The classic disruptive chart shows two technologies improving in parallel,

That chart is not of competing technologies, but of market demand and one technology. The classic disruptive chart shows two technologies improving in parallel, but the performance customers demand doesn't increase as fast, so eventually the disruptive technology is "good enough" for those customers (even though the incumbent technology is better still: it "overshoots") and has other desired qualities (like battery efficiency), so customers all switch to it. Here, of course, Apple is unlikely to sell its chips to other manufacturers... so any disruption will be at the product level: affecting wintel laptops, desktops... and eventually perhaps game consoles and linux servers. Everything. BTW I really enjoy his theories, but let us note that Christensen himself assessed the iphone as non-disruptive.

jldugger 6y ago
> let us note that Christensen himself assessed the iphone as non-disruptive. Which I suppose it is, but I think it's important to ask: if Apple didn't introduce a disruptive technology, why were they able to do what Nokia didn't? Its hard to deny how the iPhone represented a power shift away from carriers. It's easy to forget but a decade ago you had to pay carriers for the privilege of changing your ringtone. They had their fingers in every pie, in exchange for access to the market the carriers more or less controlled. Hell, you often couldn't even bring your phone if you switched carriers. Nokia was too busy pleasing their customers: the big cellular providers who ordered most of their phones. And the status quo heavily favored them -- the top selling phone of all time is still a Nokia phone from 2004. They didn't really have any idea how to market direct to consumer and their brand had no particular meaning -- they made as many SKUs as carriers wanted. Since they were in a clearly dominant position, they had no need to arm twist the weakest player to break into the market, and a lot to lose if they played hardball. Clay's right that it's not a traditional "cheap tech finds a new purpose undermining more expensive status quo" but it definitely rhymes -- all the incentives are the same and adequately explains why Nokia fell apart.
warkdarrior 6y ago
> let us note that Christensen himself assessed the iphone as non-disruptive Indeed the iPhone can be seen as opening a completely new market, instead of disrupting an existing technology. Laptops still exist, desktops still exist, servers still exist. iPhone expanded the technologies available, did not replace any existing one.
bwilliams18 6y ago
Allworth on Exponent and Ben Thompson (his co-host on Exponent) have both explained that Clay was in fact wrong about iPhone being non-disruptive because he didn't understand the ultimate value of the iPhone, and got stuck in the hardware<>os as a single point of integration.
pas 6y ago
anyone wondering, I guess this is the "classic chart": https://hbr.org/resources/images/article_assets/2015/11/R1512B_BIG_MODEL-1200x1035.png https://hbr.org/resources/images/article_assets/2015/11/R151...
runeks 6y ago
> Here, of course, Apple is unlikely to sell its chips to other manufacturers... How do you gather? I think it'd make sense for Apple to earn more money by acquiring Intel's customers.
- hyperpallium2 6y ago
  Firstly, it's not Apple's way. They favour vertical integration and premium-pricing. Secondly, why have part of the pie when you can have the whole pie? i.e. instead of just acquiring Intel's customers, also acquire their customers, all the way to the end-consumer, gobbling up the margins at each step of the way.
  - runeks 6y ago
    > Secondly, why have part of the pie when you can have the whole pie? This entails converting all Windows user into macOS users. This is not realistic, in my opinion. In the end, the question should be what makes the most money: keeping Apple silicon exclusive to Apple (and thus selling more Apple devices) or selling Apple CPUs to competitors (and thus adding a new income stream). I think option number two would make Apple more money, and therefore shareholders should prefer this approach.

jldugger 6y ago

> let us note that Christensen himself assessed the iphone as non-disruptive. Which I suppose it is, but I think it's important to ask: if Apple didn't introduce a disruptive technology, why were they able to do what Nokia didn't? Its hard to deny how the iPhone represented a power shift away from carriers. It's easy to forget but a decade ago you had to pay carriers for the privilege of changing your ringtone. They had their fingers in every pie, in exchange for access to the market the carriers more or less controlled. Hell, you often couldn't even bring your phone if you switched carriers. Nokia was too busy pleasing their customers: the big cellular providers who ordered most of their phones. And the status quo heavily favored them -- the top selling phone of all time is still a Nokia phone from 2004. They didn't really have any idea how to market direct to consumer and their brand had no particular meaning -- they made as many SKUs as carriers wanted. Since they were in a clearly dominant position, they had no need to arm twist the weakest player to break into the market, and a lot to lose if they played hardball. Clay's right that it's not a traditional "cheap tech finds a new purpose undermining more expensive status quo" but it definitely rhymes -- all the incentives are the same and adequately explains why Nokia fell apart.

warkdarrior 6y ago

> let us note that Christensen himself assessed the iphone as non-disruptive Indeed the iPhone can be seen as opening a completely new market, instead of disrupting an existing technology. Laptops still exist, desktops still exist, servers still exist. iPhone expanded the technologies available, did not replace any existing one.

bwilliams18 6y ago

Allworth on Exponent and Ben Thompson (his co-host on Exponent) have both explained that Clay was in fact wrong about iPhone being non-disruptive because he didn't understand the ultimate value of the iPhone, and got stuck in the hardware<>os as a single point of integration.

pas 6y ago

anyone wondering, I guess this is the "classic chart": https://hbr.org/resources/images/article_assets/2015/11/R1512B_BIG_MODEL-1200x1035.png https://hbr.org/resources/images/article_assets/2015/11/R151...

runeks 6y ago

> Here, of course, Apple is unlikely to sell its chips to other manufacturers... How do you gather? I think it'd make sense for Apple to earn more money by acquiring Intel's customers.

hyperpallium2 6y ago
Firstly, it's not Apple's way. They favour vertical integration and premium-pricing. Secondly, why have part of the pie when you can have the whole pie? i.e. instead of just acquiring Intel's customers, also acquire their customers, all the way to the end-consumer, gobbling up the margins at each step of the way.
- runeks 6y ago
  > Secondly, why have part of the pie when you can have the whole pie? This entails converting all Windows user into macOS users. This is not realistic, in my opinion. In the end, the question should be what makes the most money: keeping Apple silicon exclusive to Apple (and thus selling more Apple devices) or selling Apple CPUs to competitors (and thus adding a new income stream). I think option number two would make Apple more money, and therefore shareholders should prefer this approach.