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The thing that stands out in the article for me is that it wasn't such a well hidden secret after all. From the article I got the impression that an interested

The thing that stands out in the article for me is that it wasn't such a well hidden secret after all. From the article I got the impression that an interested party could actually know that devices were rigged and pour disinformation into the channel. From the main article [1]: > The engineer, Peter Frutiger, had long suspected Crypto was collaborating with German intelligence. He had made multiple trips to Damascus to address complaints about their Crypto products and apparently, without authority from headquarters, had fixed their vulnerabilities. > Frutiger “had figured out the Minerva secret and it was not safe with him,” according to the CIA history. Even so, the agency was livid with Wagner for firing Frutiger rather than finding a way to keep him quiet on the company payroll. Frutiger declined to comment for this story. So not only Syrian customers discovered the vulnerabilities and complained about them, they actually got them fixed and then the engineer was fired for that, so things likely got ugly. Possessing the knowledge about a compromised system that you know was sold to dozens of governments, is itself a valuable diplomatic asset. I have hard time imagining it was never acted upon by no one. Which makes me think that the customer who'd actually done his homework could discover a lot of suspicious stuff. [1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-security/cia-crypto-encryption-machines-espionage/?itid=lk_interstitial_manual_5 https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/national-...

neilv 6y ago
> > Frutiger “had figured out the Minerva secret and it was not safe with him,” according to the CIA history. Even so, the agency was livid with Wagner for firing Frutiger rather than finding a way to keep him quiet on the company payroll. And, at that point, Frutiger might've suspected what kind of perceived liability he might be, and been terrified. :(
dingaling 6y ago
Crypto AG was selling knowingly-weak products for decades in conjunction with US and UK agencies. Post-war they commercially sold an Enigma variant, C-52, with documented vulnerabilities to nations that were considered to be 'of interest'. Cracking their encrypted messages was trivial. Meanwhile, trusted nations were allowed to buy the otherwise secret and secure CX-52. Rumours of this arrangement surfaced in the 1970s and again in the 1990s. Why anyone still bought from them is a mystery.

neilv 6y ago

> > Frutiger “had figured out the Minerva secret and it was not safe with him,” according to the CIA history. Even so, the agency was livid with Wagner for firing Frutiger rather than finding a way to keep him quiet on the company payroll. And, at that point, Frutiger might've suspected what kind of perceived liability he might be, and been terrified. :(

dingaling 6y ago

Crypto AG was selling knowingly-weak products for decades in conjunction with US and UK agencies. Post-war they commercially sold an Enigma variant, C-52, with documented vulnerabilities to nations that were considered to be 'of interest'. Cracking their encrypted messages was trivial. Meanwhile, trusted nations were allowed to buy the otherwise secret and secure CX-52. Rumours of this arrangement surfaced in the 1970s and again in the 1990s. Why anyone still bought from them is a mystery.