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>2. It should have a 'structure' which is similar to that of the new, not yet understood subject. If you'll forgive my pedantry, at this point you're not discu

by acoard 6y ago

>2. It should have a 'structure' which is similar to that of the new, not yet understood subject. If you'll forgive my pedantry, at this point you're not discussing metaphors and have veered into analogies. Maybe we can meet in the middle and call these metaphorical analogies? ;) Metaphors are when you say something is something it is not ("my wife's smile is the bright sun I wake up to"). There need not be anything unfamiliar with a metaphor or any explanatory power behind a metaphor. Analogies are when you explain or frame a concept using an already understood concept ("the car is out of gas, like when you're out of energy and don't want to run around.") As an aside, I'll mention that the idea that "analogy as the core of cognition"[0] has been kicking around in academia for years, and comes from Douglas Hoffstader (author of Gödel, Escher, Bach). [0] http://worrydream.com/refs/Hofstadter%20-%20Analogy%20as%20the%20Core%20of%20Cognition.pdf http://worrydream.com/refs/Hofstadter%20-%20Analogy%20as%20t...

westoncb 6y ago
> There need not be anything unfamiliar with a metaphor or any explanatory power behind a metaphor The purpose is still explanatory, it's just possible for the explanation to be in terms of perceptions rather than structure: in your example with wife/bright sun the purpose is still to make an identification between two domains, one familiar, one not ("bright sun" is familiar to the reader; author's wife is not), but rather than the two being "structurally similar" it's that they evoke similar experiences in the author, and the author is able to explain their experience by sharing this identification. That said, I agree with you that what I was discussing is closer to definitions of analogy in certain areas of cognitive science (e.g. Hofstadter's work, like you've pointed out—or John Sowa's: http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/theories.htm http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/theories.htm) But the original example with the library would've been better termed an analogy to begin with, rather than a metaphor—I just adopted the previous commenter's terminology :) (though admittedly I'm more inclined to interchange the two fluidly because I don't find the differences essential: I would just call the kind of metaphor you used a perceptual analogy. Maybe I am missing something important about metaphor though—I'd be curious to hear if so!)

by acoard 6y ago

westoncb 6y ago

> There need not be anything unfamiliar with a metaphor or any explanatory power behind a metaphor The purpose is still explanatory, it's just possible for the explanation to be in terms of perceptions rather than structure: in your example with wife/bright sun the purpose is still to make an identification between two domains, one familiar, one not ("bright sun" is familiar to the reader; author's wife is not), but rather than the two being "structurally similar" it's that they evoke similar experiences in the author, and the author is able to explain their experience by sharing this identification. That said, I agree with you that what I was discussing is closer to definitions of analogy in certain areas of cognitive science (e.g. Hofstadter's work, like you've pointed out—or John Sowa's: http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/theories.htm http://www.jfsowa.com/logic/theories.htm) But the original example with the library would've been better termed an analogy to begin with, rather than a metaphor—I just adopted the previous commenter's terminology :) (though admittedly I'm more inclined to interchange the two fluidly because I don't find the differences essential: I would just call the kind of metaphor you used a perceptual analogy. Maybe I am missing something important about metaphor though—I'd be curious to hear if so!)