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Interview with Douglas W. Jones, a computer scientist at the University of Iowa and co-author of the book Broken Ballots A fundamental flaw of direct-recording
by adolph 6y ago
Interview with Douglas W. Jones, a computer scientist at the University of Iowa and co-author of the book Broken Ballots
A fundamental flaw of direct-recording voting machines—that is, ones where you pull the lever on an old mechanical machine or you touch the touch screen on a modern one—all of those machines end up being completely impossible to audit. There’s no way to know whether the machine was honest or not, short of taking it apart and actually being able to inspect the mechanism. We have no good way of doing that with software. The complete lack of any auditable record of the count, so that you had to completely trust programmers, was a real problem. [But] the vast majority of votes in the U.S. today are being recorded on paper ballots that are filled in by hand. That makes me feel reasonably good. And furthermore, a growing number of states have some kind of an audit law.
- adolph 6y agoInterview with Douglas W. Jones, a computer scientist at the University of Iowa and co-author of the book Broken Ballots A fundamental flaw of direct-recording voting machines—that is, ones where you pull the lever on an old mechanical machine or you touch the touch screen on a modern one—all of those machines end up being completely impossible to audit. There’s no way to know whether the machine was honest or not, short of taking it apart and actually being able to inspect the mechanism. We have no good way of doing that with software. The complete lack of any auditable record of the count, so that you had to completely trust programmers, was a real problem. [But] the vast majority of votes in the U.S. today are being recorded on paper ballots that are filled in by hand. That makes me feel reasonably good. And furthermore, a growing number of states have some kind of an audit law. Broken Ballots book website: http://timbergroves.com/bb/ http://timbergroves.com/bb/ Douglas W. Jones: http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/~jones/ http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/~jones/
- Spivak 6y agoI don't get this one since digital voting machines right now today have auditing built-in that can be done by anyone. When you submit your vote it prints out a paper receipt you drop in a box that can be counted asynchronously and take as long as needed to verify the digital count. Best of both worlds.
- sambe 6y ago"Can be" or "will be"?
- Spivak 6y agoI mean voting is a very human affair. If you don't trust the humans to count the votes to verify the results then you couldn't trust them to count normal paper ballots either.
- mshook 6y agoThe way it's done here in France is it's just random voters who offer to do the recount (usually after being asked because it's pretty boring haha). And you don't count alone, there are people with you who count with you and who double check what you do. It works the following way. You legally must have: - one person who opens the envelope containing the ballot and unfolds it - one who reads out loud the ballot - at least two who write down what the person above said And all that is supervised by the same people who were manning the polling station (at least 4 them). So it becomes a lot harder not to trust humans when you have at least 4 persons who saw the ballot and a couple others observing if everything is being done as expected.
- jcynix 6y agoIn Germany you can watch the local committees while they are counting. it's an open affair. And you'll hear the numbers as the results are reported by phone to the next level. Which allows anyone who was present during the counting to audit the numbers when they are published afterwards. And yes, I did watch every now and then.
- mshook 6y agoBut does the digital count ever get verified in the real world? If it is every time, it means at the end of the day you don't really trust the machine. You could announce results early but they wouldn't be official so what's the point? And if the count only gets verified every once in a while, what triggers the process? Something abnormal? A random check? Something else? What tells you the count is valid or not? How do you ensure the machine is working as it should, wasn't altered in any way and so on? To me these problems can't really be fixed: you need the paper trail. And you can't "count" (haha) on a machine you can't really audit.