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It's a good question, crytpo can be used for this sort of thing. It does preclude editing, unless you also establish a cryptographic trust chain where each succ
by ip26 6y ago
It's a good question, crytpo can be used for this sort of thing. It does preclude editing, unless you also establish a cryptographic trust chain where each successive editor also has a trusted key.
Probably never going to work with cameraphone journalism, but if we're talking about newsroom & press conference footage you could make it happen.
- enchiridion 6y agoWhy not? Can't there be "TLS for cameras"?
- filleokus 6y agoExpect from editing, which, as you say should be able to be solved somehow (encrypt every frame?), I think the biggest problem is the equivalent of the "analog hole". How do you know if a signed recording is from the actual event, or from a camera being pointed at a screen in a pitch black room recording the playback of some malicious video trying to show said event?
- ip26 6y agoTrust. If the root signatory is CNN, you decide whether you trust CNN not to do that. Not really any different from other encryption. Your bank could be defrauding you on the back end despite the verified https session. But you trust they aren't.
- filleokus 6y agoWhy do we need to sign the video then? Isn't it enough for me to ensure that I have a secure TLS connection to https://cnn.com https://cnn.com? Maybe for external platforms? But then the challenge is just proving that https://www.youtube.com/user/CNN/ https://www.youtube.com/user/CNN/ is controlled by CNN. Much simpler than involving the cameras.
- ip26 6y agoThe hope would be that if video clips were verifiable, they would be widely expected to be verified, such that when someone links to "old clip of Senator says outlandish thing", you habitually check to see if it's verified- no matter who or what is re-sharing it.