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Absolutely. You should trust anything as much as you can verify it and no further. I submit that there is no better option right now.
by josh2600 6y ago
Absolutely. You should trust anything as much as you can verify it and no further.
I submit that there is no better option right now.
- upofadown 6y agoIf you are not trusting the people that are running these things, then Signal is just another siloed messenger where the servers are controlled by a single entity. There are certainly worse but Signal is not special.
- monocasa 6y agoSignal has open clients with reproducible builds. We know that they are keeping their promises wrt what information is communicated with the backends. That's a step above the other options in common use, and in fact does make Signal special.
- jki275 6y agoAre you running an open client? Is anyone? That's all a smoke screen. Nobody is running an open client with a reproducible build, everybody is running whatever version is downloaded from their app store of choice. It's not special, and I don't trust it a bit.
- monocasa 6y agoThe point of reproducible builds isn't to run an open client, but validate that their copy in the app store matches the source they say it does.
- jki275 6y agoBut nobody actually does that.
- 10000truths 6y agoNot manually, perhaps. But automated integrity checks of reproducible builds are trivial to write.
- cyphar 6y agoHave you personally done that? Do you know of anyone who is doing that and publicly tracks said verification? It doesn't matter how trivial it would be to verify if nobody is actually doing the verification (not to mention you'd actually want many people doing it and publicly posting their verification, as well as you checking that your hash matches everyone else's before installing the APK -- and there is no automated setup for doing that on Android.)
- jki275 6y agoI don't think any significant number of people do it. I don't use Signal specifically, but I don't even know that there is a way for me to actually do it and then track whether that matches the version the iOS app store loaded on my phone, at least not without jailbreaking the phone.
- Mediterraneo10 6y ago> Signal has open clients with reproducible builds. Not really. First of all, there is only one Signal client allowed to connect to Signal’s servers. And in the real world, the vast majority of Signal uses are getting their APK for that app from the Google Play store (the Signal team has said that they prefer you to use the Play store as well, instead of direct-downloading an APK from their website which they offer only grudgingly). That means that a state-level actor could possibly carry out a targeted attack to replace the Signal app on a given person's phone with a malicious build. Also, Signal’s reproducible build system requires a specific version of the Android development kit. It has been pointed out that a state-level actor could be sitting on vulnerabilities in that, and not in the Signal source code itself.
- codethief 6y ago> That means that a state-level actor could possibly carry out a targeted attack to replace the Signal app on a given person's phone with a malicious build. No, they couldn't. They would need the Signal developers' key. Android requires app updates to be signed with the same key as the original app.
- cyphar 6y agoA state-level actor can get the Signal key either covertly or by simply marching into the Signal offices with either a warrant or (if that fails) guns. Now, whether that will actually happen is a secondary issue -- but I submit that you have a mistaken conception of what a "state-level actor" means in a threat model. The fact that Google Inc doesn't hold the necessary keys but Signal LLC does is not a meaningful distinction to a state-level actor. That isn't to say "all crypto is hopeless", simply that you shouldn't consider Signal to be state-level actor proof.
- monocasa 6y agoThe point isn't to build your own and use it; it's to verify that the binary in the app store matches the source they published.
- 6y ago
- hammock 6y agoWhat's better, Signal or Telegram?
- codethief 6y agoIn contrast to Signal, Telegram doesn't end-to-end-encrypt messages by default (they get stored in plaintext on their servers), it also doesn't protect the social graph and even stores your contact list on their servers. Even WhatsApp is more secure than Telegram.
- hammock 6y agoAwesome. Thanks
- upofadown 6y agoThey are more or less the same thing if you are not trusting anyone. Both require you have to verify the key fingerprint for a particular contact (safety numbers) if you want effective end to end encryption. Both are silos. Telegram is better about distribution and can be gotten from places you might trust better (e.g. F-droid, Debian). Both have some sort of reproducible build thing going on. Both could get access to your connections to other users if they wanted where Signal also insists on access to everyone's phone number. Telegram works on desktop without also insisting you have the program running on your phone.
- upofadown 6y agoAddendum because I can't edit any more. Apparently Telegram needs a phone number as well.
- josh2600 6y agoI would be interested to learn if you have examples of services whose privacy practices you admire more than signal’s.