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> Clearly the real numbers are a model for these axioms. But as it turns out the countable set of rational numbers is a model as well. You missed the crucial p
by pdonis 6y ago
> Clearly the real numbers are a model for these axioms. But as it turns out the countable set of rational numbers is a model as well.
You missed the crucial property that rules out the rationals (more precisely, the rationals with their standard ordering): one way of stating it is that every sequence that has an upper bound in the set, must have a least upper bound in the set. The rationals do not satisfy this property (for example, consider the sequence of successive decimal expansions, each one to one more decimal place, of sqrt(2)), but the reals do.
The challenge for me is to understand how there can still be countable sets that also satisfy that property of the reals. (Obviously any countable set can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the rationals, but for a countable set that satisfies the least upper bound property of the reals, such a correspondence with the rationals would put an ordering on the rationals that was not the standard one.)
- zzless 6y agoIn fact, he did not miss anything. Using the language he started with (variables range over 'numbers', and the relations are <, >, +, and *), the reals and the rationals indeed have the same properties (elementary theory as logicians would put it). The reason things like \sqrt2 present no problems is that it is simply impossible to define such 'sequences of numbers' in this theory (you are only allowed to 'refer' to numbers by your variables, not ordinary sets and the usual language for sets is missing). If I remember right, the fact he was referring to was proved by Tarsky.
- saithound 6y agoThe reals and the rationals do not have the same elementary theory over the language (>,+,*).
- zzless 6y agoYou are correct, one would have to exclude the multiplication for that.
- pdonis 6y ago> he reason things like \sqrt2 present no problems is that it is simply impossible to define such 'sequences of numbers' in this theory (you are only allowed to 'refer' to numbers by your variables, not ordinary sets and the usual language for sets is missing). Doesn't that mean that you can't even define the reals using the language he started with? If your language doesn't even let you express the difference between the reals and the rationals, it seems to me that the thing to do is to extend your language until it can.
- Kranar 6y agoYou're right that it is not possible to define the reals using the language he started with, but it's worse than that. It's also not possible to define the natural numbers using any first order theory. There is no way to extend a first order theory so that it defines the natural numbers and only the natural numbers and furthermore there is no way to define a first order theory that defines the reals and only the reals. Having said that, you were originally right that no theory of the reals can be satisfied by the rationals, but that's for a fairly unrelated reason.
- pdonis 6y ago> It's also not possible to define the natural numbers using any first order theory. Yes, agreed. > you were originally right that no theory of the reals can be satisfied by the rationals, but that's for a fairly unrelated reason. Can you elaborate?
- Kranar 6y agoAt a minimum any theory of real numbers will imply a theorem of the form "There exists an x such that x * x = 2". The set of rational numbers doesn't contain any such x and hence the rational numbers will not satisfy any theory of real numbers.
- zzless 6y agoYou are correct, I should have omitted the * from the language.