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> is there a chance we might see the Matrix or brain uploads in our lifetimes? And if not in our lifetime, is it ever achievable? How could you upload just you

> is there a chance we might see the Matrix or brain uploads in our lifetimes? And if not in our lifetime, is it ever achievable? How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely?. This overlaps with Transporter problem from Star Trek and the Prestige, it's not you who lives in there, just a copy. >but human BCI could be the best/most important development in our history. Any problem gradient with a chance of unlocking immortality should be leaned into. You would be creating a mirror of yourself on the computer, it wouldn't be you. An immortality for your brain image maybe.

uep 6y ago
I think the Ship of Theseus is a related philosophical thought experiment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus Even without your previous experience, you are literally not the same cells that you were a few years ago. As such, to achieve the same kind of continuity of consciousness and become fully digital, I think one would have to gradually replace their brain.
- lyxsus 6y ago
  I always thought it's an obvious and solid solution. And if we assume it's possible to do a snapshot and have a perfect mind clone in I can't see how there can be any doubt it'll work.
  - Zamicol 6y ago
    There's a 32 light year volume that encompass my whole history. The universe seems to preserve every point of my life to a resolution. If https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropic_gravity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropic_gravity turns out correct (or something like it), my life is preserved in perfect resolution across an increasingly large volume of space. Separately: There's no point in my life where I'm ever the same person. I've continually evolved. With human history, the resolution of records continues to expand. Fossils, artifacts, writing, photos, and Google search logs all contain personal information. The resolution of historical information shows a clear trend. Am I immortal if only a moment of my life is preserved, or am I immortal if all points of my life can be accurately be resimulated? I would argue there is no difference. In order to resimulate me at any point in time, my context, my surroundings, must be considered. My context exists for historic reasons. In order for my brain to be interpretable its application in real world interactions must be considered the the world can only be understood by knowing its history. To know me you need to know my life and surroundings at all points in time. Technology is slowing increasing the resolution of human immortality, although the universe seems to have already accomplished this perfectly.
- friendlybus 6y ago
  The structure of the body more or less remains the same. Ship of Theseus hits the same limits evolution does. We don't really become a completely different species from local changes. What is the point of information if you can't embody it? I guess the desirability of immortality in a computer system completely relies on how faithfully the system can pretend on your behalf, that you have a body. An endless heaven without having a body to structure your sensations and grant you movement through space and time... seems lacking.
- cpdwighthertzog 6y ago
  It would not be necessary to gradually replace the brain, nor any other parts of the connectome. If you agree that cognition is due to physical processes of the brain, then it is impossible that consciousness is anything more than very advanced logic. You could devise a situation in which a person is gradually converted into a robotic form, and another where he is simply replaced with a robotic clone, such that you would end up with the same exact logical brain(contained within the robot) in both cases. So, in this instance, where does cognition diverge? If the gradual replacement results in the continuation of the stream of consciousness, but the creation of a robotic copy does not, then why can't that difference be physically measured? Would you suggest a supernatural explanation? Or is the experience consciousness as shallow as the belief that it has been preserved (which I say it is)?
  - uep 6y ago
    I think you misinterpreted my comment. The poster I was responding to was talking about how it would not be the same consciousness, but a clone of that consciousness. I am not making any unprovable claims about a spirit/soul, though I do not completely shut out the possibility there is something we haven't measured yet. I believe that externally, there is no difference in your scenario. I think where there might be a difference, is to the consciousness itself. The continuity of that experience being the difference. In which case, gradually replacing the brain should be a solution to the continuity problem (like the Ship of Theseus). Where I think this is conceptually weakest, is when considering how much continuity of consciousness exists while sleeping or being sedated.
echelon 6y ago
> How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely?. This overlaps with Transporter problem from Star Trek and the Prestige, it's not you who lives in there, just a copy. I don't think it would be a problem if it isn't the same you or if the old you dies. Linear continuity is rooted in our biology, and this would be something entirely new that requires new ways of thinking about it. Reconstituting memories and information would be a game changer. Imagine manipulating them! Making them more efficient encodings, removing inaccuracies, etc. (There's a lot of potential for bad here too.) Cloning memories, merging them... If you're extremely concerned about not being the same person, maybe consciousness can expand to fill a vacuum? I'm not particularly concerned, but there might be ways of dealing with the issue. This is all so sci-fi that it probably makes the researchers laugh and shake their heads.
njarboe 6y ago
Neal Stephenson wrote a science fiction novel "Fall; or, Dodge in Hell" that came out in 2019 whose plot is about the uploading of people into computer systems. It covers a range of ideas and possibilities with plot lines outside and inside of the computer system. Highly recommended if you are interested in thinking about this topic in more detail. Also a pretty fun read. I still have the last bit of the book to finish.
- mrspeaker 6y ago
  An oft-covered topic in science fiction! My favourite take on it is Permutation City by Greg Egan... it's from 1994, but reads like it was written yesterday!
- blacksmith_tb 6y ago
  An even more hellish vision is Iain Banks' _Surface Detail_ [1] where some civilizations upload the consciousnesses of thousands of their citizens into simulations that make them suffer (at least there are counterexamples that upload themselves into 'heaven'). 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Detail https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Detail
avz 6y ago
> How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely? In practice, people who received heart transplants are generally considered to be the same person as they had been before the transplantation, so it seems most of us have already accepted that you don't need the whole body.
- AnimalMuppet 6y ago
  Um, in practice, the number of people who have actually received a head transplant is precisely zero. So how they are considered is about as relevant as how Harry Potter is considered.
  - webmaven 6y ago
    > Um, in practice, the number of people who have actually received a head transplant is precisely zero. So how they are considered is about as relevant as how Harry Potter is considered. Reread the GP: "heart transplant"
    - AnimalMuppet 6y ago
      Um... oops. No wonder I was being downvoted. In fairness, the context was uploading the brain, and whether the whole body was needed, so it was a semi-reasonable misread. Still... there's a large distance from "I can have a heart transplant and still be considered the same person (even though 1% of my body now has different DNA)" to "I can have no body at all and still be the same person". The claim was that a body is a significant part of who we are as people, which is not a claim that a heart transplant addresses at all.
      - webmaven 6y ago
        > [T]here's a large distance from "I can have a heart transplant and still be considered the same person (even though 1% of my body now has different DNA)" to "I can have no body at all and still be the same person". The claim was that a body is a significant part of who we are as people, which is not a claim that a heart transplant addresses at all. All right, let's tackle it a bit more directly than replacement: Does amputation of a limb diminish an individual's personhood? Is your answer dependent on the use of a prosthetic?
toyg 6y ago
Look up Altered Carbon, a scifi novel from which two high-quality TV mini-series were recently produced. It's the whole premise. Bodies become disposable "sleeves".
mastre_ 6y ago
> You would be creating a mirror of yourself on the computer, it wouldn't be you. It's possible that the new you would believe you are still you, even though you would be a separate new you. I think what we're really touching upon here is that it starts to go against our belief that we are exceptionally special. And of course we are -- we don't really know any better. But maybe it simply doesn't matter and it would be good enough. Think of it like going to sleep -- how do you really know, beyond theoretical doubt, that you're still "you" when you wake up? I'm simply here to provide a perspective perhaps not often considered. More for sparking additional thinking on the subject than anything else. I too believe we're super duper special unique snowflakes ;)
- goatlover 6y ago
  You’re digital copy might not be conscious, if consciousness isn’t something we figure out how to simulate. It’s speculation at this point that a simulated mind would be conscious. We simply don’t know that to be true.
dragonwriter 6y ago
> How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely?. This overlaps with Transporter problem from Star Trek and the Prestige, it's not you who lives in there, just a copy. Does it matter of the substrate is replaced a bit at a time or all at once? If so, why? If not, how is the “transporter problem” any different than what every person goes through all the time?

uep 6y ago

I think the Ship of Theseus is a related philosophical thought experiment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus Even without your previous experience, you are literally not the same cells that you were a few years ago. As such, to achieve the same kind of continuity of consciousness and become fully digital, I think one would have to gradually replace their brain.

lyxsus 6y ago
I always thought it's an obvious and solid solution. And if we assume it's possible to do a snapshot and have a perfect mind clone in I can't see how there can be any doubt it'll work.
- Zamicol 6y ago
  There's a 32 light year volume that encompass my whole history. The universe seems to preserve every point of my life to a resolution. If https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropic_gravity https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropic_gravity turns out correct (or something like it), my life is preserved in perfect resolution across an increasingly large volume of space. Separately: There's no point in my life where I'm ever the same person. I've continually evolved. With human history, the resolution of records continues to expand. Fossils, artifacts, writing, photos, and Google search logs all contain personal information. The resolution of historical information shows a clear trend. Am I immortal if only a moment of my life is preserved, or am I immortal if all points of my life can be accurately be resimulated? I would argue there is no difference. In order to resimulate me at any point in time, my context, my surroundings, must be considered. My context exists for historic reasons. In order for my brain to be interpretable its application in real world interactions must be considered the the world can only be understood by knowing its history. To know me you need to know my life and surroundings at all points in time. Technology is slowing increasing the resolution of human immortality, although the universe seems to have already accomplished this perfectly.
friendlybus 6y ago
The structure of the body more or less remains the same. Ship of Theseus hits the same limits evolution does. We don't really become a completely different species from local changes. What is the point of information if you can't embody it? I guess the desirability of immortality in a computer system completely relies on how faithfully the system can pretend on your behalf, that you have a body. An endless heaven without having a body to structure your sensations and grant you movement through space and time... seems lacking.
cpdwighthertzog 6y ago
It would not be necessary to gradually replace the brain, nor any other parts of the connectome. If you agree that cognition is due to physical processes of the brain, then it is impossible that consciousness is anything more than very advanced logic. You could devise a situation in which a person is gradually converted into a robotic form, and another where he is simply replaced with a robotic clone, such that you would end up with the same exact logical brain(contained within the robot) in both cases. So, in this instance, where does cognition diverge? If the gradual replacement results in the continuation of the stream of consciousness, but the creation of a robotic copy does not, then why can't that difference be physically measured? Would you suggest a supernatural explanation? Or is the experience consciousness as shallow as the belief that it has been preserved (which I say it is)?
- uep 6y ago
  I think you misinterpreted my comment. The poster I was responding to was talking about how it would not be the same consciousness, but a clone of that consciousness. I am not making any unprovable claims about a spirit/soul, though I do not completely shut out the possibility there is something we haven't measured yet. I believe that externally, there is no difference in your scenario. I think where there might be a difference, is to the consciousness itself. The continuity of that experience being the difference. In which case, gradually replacing the brain should be a solution to the continuity problem (like the Ship of Theseus). Where I think this is conceptually weakest, is when considering how much continuity of consciousness exists while sleeping or being sedated.

echelon 6y ago

> How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely?. This overlaps with Transporter problem from Star Trek and the Prestige, it's not you who lives in there, just a copy. I don't think it would be a problem if it isn't the same you or if the old you dies. Linear continuity is rooted in our biology, and this would be something entirely new that requires new ways of thinking about it. Reconstituting memories and information would be a game changer. Imagine manipulating them! Making them more efficient encodings, removing inaccuracies, etc. (There's a lot of potential for bad here too.) Cloning memories, merging them... If you're extremely concerned about not being the same person, maybe consciousness can expand to fill a vacuum? I'm not particularly concerned, but there might be ways of dealing with the issue. This is all so sci-fi that it probably makes the researchers laugh and shake their heads.

njarboe 6y ago

Neal Stephenson wrote a science fiction novel "Fall; or, Dodge in Hell" that came out in 2019 whose plot is about the uploading of people into computer systems. It covers a range of ideas and possibilities with plot lines outside and inside of the computer system. Highly recommended if you are interested in thinking about this topic in more detail. Also a pretty fun read. I still have the last bit of the book to finish.

mrspeaker 6y ago
An oft-covered topic in science fiction! My favourite take on it is Permutation City by Greg Egan... it's from 1994, but reads like it was written yesterday!
blacksmith_tb 6y ago
An even more hellish vision is Iain Banks' _Surface Detail_ [1] where some civilizations upload the consciousnesses of thousands of their citizens into simulations that make them suffer (at least there are counterexamples that upload themselves into 'heaven'). 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Detail https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surface_Detail

avz 6y ago

> How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely? In practice, people who received heart transplants are generally considered to be the same person as they had been before the transplantation, so it seems most of us have already accepted that you don't need the whole body.

AnimalMuppet 6y ago
Um, in practice, the number of people who have actually received a head transplant is precisely zero. So how they are considered is about as relevant as how Harry Potter is considered.
- webmaven 6y ago
  > Um, in practice, the number of people who have actually received a head transplant is precisely zero. So how they are considered is about as relevant as how Harry Potter is considered. Reread the GP: "heart transplant"
  - AnimalMuppet 6y ago
    Um... oops. No wonder I was being downvoted. In fairness, the context was uploading the brain, and whether the whole body was needed, so it was a semi-reasonable misread. Still... there's a large distance from "I can have a heart transplant and still be considered the same person (even though 1% of my body now has different DNA)" to "I can have no body at all and still be the same person". The claim was that a body is a significant part of who we are as people, which is not a claim that a heart transplant addresses at all.
    - webmaven 6y ago
      > [T]here's a large distance from "I can have a heart transplant and still be considered the same person (even though 1% of my body now has different DNA)" to "I can have no body at all and still be the same person". The claim was that a body is a significant part of who we are as people, which is not a claim that a heart transplant addresses at all. All right, let's tackle it a bit more directly than replacement: Does amputation of a limb diminish an individual's personhood? Is your answer dependent on the use of a prosthetic?

toyg 6y ago

Look up Altered Carbon, a scifi novel from which two high-quality TV mini-series were recently produced. It's the whole premise. Bodies become disposable "sleeves".

mastre_ 6y ago

> You would be creating a mirror of yourself on the computer, it wouldn't be you. It's possible that the new you would believe you are still you, even though you would be a separate new you. I think what we're really touching upon here is that it starts to go against our belief that we are exceptionally special. And of course we are -- we don't really know any better. But maybe it simply doesn't matter and it would be good enough. Think of it like going to sleep -- how do you really know, beyond theoretical doubt, that you're still "you" when you wake up? I'm simply here to provide a perspective perhaps not often considered. More for sparking additional thinking on the subject than anything else. I too believe we're super duper special unique snowflakes ;)

goatlover 6y ago
You’re digital copy might not be conscious, if consciousness isn’t something we figure out how to simulate. It’s speculation at this point that a simulated mind would be conscious. We simply don’t know that to be true.

dragonwriter 6y ago

> How could you upload just your brain and be the same person? Need your whole body, surely?. This overlaps with Transporter problem from Star Trek and the Prestige, it's not you who lives in there, just a copy. Does it matter of the substrate is replaced a bit at a time or all at once? If so, why? If not, how is the “transporter problem” any different than what every person goes through all the time?