Eh, thanks for the info on MTProto2. They made poor decisions initially, and doubled down on them, and thus I didn't (and still don't) think it worth my time to

Eh, thanks for the info on MTProto2. They made poor decisions initially, and doubled down on them, and thus I didn't (and still don't) think it worth my time to follow their changelog. The contests are not remotely sufficient. Here's a good article: https://www.cryptofails.com/post/70546720222/telegrams-cryptanalysis-contest https://www.cryptofails.com/post/70546720222/telegrams-crypt... "I’ll repeat it again: If you want to show that a system is secure, give the adversary as much power as possible, and if they still can’t break it, the security is good." Secure protocols take a lot of expert analysis to build consensus that they're worthwhile. That requires engaging with the community of researchers on their own terms and using established best practices. Finally, Telegram's server code is still closed source and thus can't be reasonably audited. Could an attacker (or state actor) with server access decrypt stored messages? Maybe! That's why default e2e encryption with well-audited, open-source code is the gold standard...