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>Like the key agility that makes the Axolotl Ratchet so superior to GPG, I am not sure how you can usefully compare a thing originally intended to secure email
by upofadown 6y ago
>Like the key agility that makes the Axolotl Ratchet so superior to GPG,
I am not sure how you can usefully compare a thing originally intended to secure email to a thing intended to secure IM.
The ratchet only provides forward secrecy anyway. My take on that is that it is a pointless thing for something like email and pointless in practice for most IM applications. Most IM users keep their old messages and practically all email users keep their old messages...
There is nothing particularly wrong with Signal. Some of the criticism might a reaction to the constant promotion of it over all other things, even when (as in this case) the things are fundamentally different.
- toast0 6y agoIt provides forward secrecy and deniability. Your chat database doesn't prove that I said what your database says I said.
- upofadown 6y agoBoth Signal and OTR provide deniability in a narrow cryptographic sense with no real practical benefit. Cool idea though...
- petertodd 6y agoFor that to have any hope of working, you need easily available tools that can fake a chat database. Currently, I'm not aware of any such tools, and I'm not even sure that you can import a faked chat log into Signal on Apple iOS. In court none of that is likely to hold up anyway, as evidence like chat databases is pretty much assumed to be true until proven otherwise.
- cyphar 6y agoIt should be noted that (while cool from a cryptographic perspective), this security primitive is practically useless in any scenario where you might think it would be useful: * The burden of evidence to introduce chat logs in legal proceedings is much lower than you would think. Often screenshots of Facebook messages are used, or SMS records (which are also easily spoofed). A judge or jury will likely not entertain the possibility the messages were fabricated unless you have substantial evidence to the contrary. * If you're scared of national security actors discovering you've leaked some information, the fact there is a record of the secret information in the other person's phone is more than enough for them to black bag you. (And let's be honest, lack of evidence has never stopped the USA from black bagging people.) * Generally speaking, the probability of the chat record being faked is so small that no reasonable person will entertain the possibility it was faked (even though it could've been). Not to mention there are all sorts of forensic methods to prove that a particular person wrote some message using fingerprinting, and ultimately Signal LLC does actually know whether you sent a message or not and who to (though admittedly they claim they don't keep metadata logs). Now, if you're dealing with an anonymised chat system with this property then it could be argued it is practically useful. But at that point the anonymisation is doing most of the heavy lifting.
- zepto 6y ago> The burden of evidence to introduce chat logs in legal proceedings is much lower than you would think. Often screenshots of Facebook messages are used, or SMS records (which are also easily spoofed). A judge or jury will likely not entertain the possibility the messages were fabricated unless you have substantial evidence to the contrary. This is true for now. It seems likely that fabrication of screenshots etc will start to appear in legal cases, and as soon as it does, the burden of proof will shift.