> You can't coherently be alarmed by Signal's use of SGX while at the same time endorsing systems that use no cryptography whatsoever to protect the metadata Si

> You can't coherently be alarmed by Signal's use of SGX while at the same time endorsing systems that use no cryptography whatsoever to protect the metadata Signal uses SGX for. You can be: It isn't difficult to argue that signal overstates the security properties of their solution. It's not an incoherent position to say that it's more important to be conservative (or at least accurate) about the claimed properties than it is to provide epsilon more security. If it were the case that signal claimed that this metadata had no privacy towards them (and the hosts running their systems), but when you dig into the protocol or detailed tech docs you find that they're using SGX to minimize risk-- then I think there would be nothing to fault about the addition of SGX. In that case it would be purely additive security.